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SHOTGUN IDENTIFICATION ON GROUPS
JACOB RAYMOND, ROBERT BLAND, AND KEVIN MCGOFF
Abstract. We consider the problem of shotgun identification of patterns on
groups, which extends previous work on shotgun identification of DNA se-
quences and labeled graphs. A shotgun identification problem on a group G is
specified by two finite subsets C ⊂ G and K ⊂ G and a finite alphabet A. In
such problems, there is a “global” pattern w ∈ ACK , and one would like to be
able to identify this pattern (up to translation) based only on observation of
the “local” K-shaped subpatterns of w, called reads, centered at the elements
of C. We consider an asymptotic regime in which the size of w tends to infinity
and the symbols of w are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion. Our first general result
establishes sufficient conditions under which the random pattern w is identi-
fiable from its reads with probability tending to one, and our second general
result establishes sufficient conditions under which the random pattern w is
non-identifiable with probability tending to one. Additionally, we illustrate
our main results by applying them to several families of examples.
1. Introduction
The basic task in any “shotgun” assembly or identification problem is to recon-
struct some type of global object using only knowledge of its local structure. As a
prototypical problem of this type, one may imagine trying to reconstruct a jigsaw
puzzle without knowledge of the image it creates. The term “shotgun” comes from
the problem of genome sequencing, in which one attempts to reconstruct an or-
ganism’s genome by connecting relatively small fragments of the organism’s DNA,
called reads. Another example of this type of problem that has been treated in
the literature is the reconstruction of a labeled graph from observations of the
neighborhoods within the graph.
In this paper, we are interested in shotgun identification problems on groups.
The group structure can be thought of as providing an orientation for each of the
reads. To describe these problems formally, we begin with a countable (finite or
infinite) group G, a finite center set C ⊂ G, and a finite read shape K ⊂ G.
Additionally, we let A be a finite set of symbols, called the alphabet. We suppose
that there is a pattern w ∈ ACK , and in principle we would like to reconstruct w.
However, we do not have access to the entire pattern. Instead, we only observe the
K-shaped patterns w|cK centered at the elements c in C. More precisely, we let
MS(E) denote the set of multi-sets of any set E, and we define the read operator
RC,K : ACK →MS(AK) by setting
RC,K(w) =
{
w|cK : c ∈ C
} ⊂ AK .
The elements in RC,K(w) are known as reads. We remark that we view the reads
as patterns on K, as opposed to patterns on cK, so that the location of these
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subpatterns within the original pattern w is not known. For more details, see
Section 2. With these definitions, the goal of shotgun reconstruction or assembly is
to reconstruct the pattern w ∈ ACK based only on knowledge of G, C, K, A, and
RC,K(w).
The idea of identifiability, defined formally below, is that it describes the situa-
tion when the reads RC,K(w) contain enough information to identify the original
pattern w. However, first we must carefully define what we consider to be successful
identification. In the group-theoretic setting considered here, we need to account
for the presence of symmetries arising from group translations. Let us say that a
pattern w′ ∈ ACK is a C-preserving translate of w if there exists a group element
g ∈ G that preserves the center set (i.e., gC = C) and such that w(h) = w′(gh)
for all h ∈ CK. If w′ is such a translate of w, then RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′) (see
Lemma 2.5), and therefore it is impossible to distinguish w and w′ from their reads.
Thus, we consider reconstruction to be successful if the reconstructed pattern is a
C-preserving translate of the original pattern.
For a pattern w ∈ ACK , it may happen that RC,K(w) provides enough informa-
tion to determine w (up to translation), and in other cases there may be (many)
other patterns in ACK that are consistent with the observed reads. In the present
setting, we consider w to be (C,K)-identifiable (or just identifiable) if RC,K(w)
provides enough information to determine w uniquely up to C-preserving transla-
tion. More precisely, we say that a pattern w ∈ ACK is (C,K)-identifiable if the
following condition holds: for every pattern w′ ∈ ACK , if RC,K(w′) = RC,K(w),
then there exists g ∈ G such that gC = C and w(h) = w′(gh) for every h ∈ CK.
We remark that there is a naive reconstruction algorithm (exhaustive search for a
pattern that is consistent with the reads, with ties broken arbitrarily) such that for
all identifiable w, the algorithm returns a C-preserving translate of w when given
RC,K(w) as input. Furthermore, there is no deterministic reconstruction algorithm
such that for all non-identifiable patterns w, the algorithm returns a C-preserving
translate of w when given RC,K(w) as input.
In this work we seek to analyze the probability of a random pattern being identi-
fiable. To state our main results, we require a few more definitions. First, let IC,K
be the set of all (C,K)-identifiable patterns in ACK , and then define a probability
space on ACK with the discrete σ-algebra and the product measure µp = pCK for
some probability vector p = (pa)a∈A on A. In order to avoid trivialities, we assume
throughout that p gives positive probability to at least two symbols in A.
We can then consider the measure of all identifiable patterns µp(IC,K), i.e., the
probability that a random pattern is identifiable. In fact, we consider the asymp-
totic regime in which the size of the problem tends to infinity. That is, suppose we
are given sequences {Gn}, {Cn}, and {Kn} such that |CnKn| → ∞, as well as some
fixed A and p. Let {µnp} be the sequence of probability measures on ACnKn defined
by µnp = p
CnKn . Then we say that identifiability holds asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.) if
lim
n→∞
µnp
(ICn,Kn) = 1,
and non-identifiability holds a.a.s. if
lim
n→∞
µnp
(ICn,Kn) = 0.
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1.1. Statement of main results. Our main results address both identifiability
and non-identifiability. In our first main result (Theorem 1.1 below), we give suf-
ficient conditions to have identifiability a.a.s. In our second main result (Theorem
1.2 below), we give sufficient conditions to have non-identifiability a.a.s. In Section
1.2, we also present applications of these results to some specific families of exam-
ples, including cases in which the read shapes are hypercubes in the group Zd or
balls (in the word metric) in finitely generated groups.
In order to state our general identifiability result, we require a few more def-
initions. Along with the countable group G and finite subsets C and K, we let
F ⊂ P(K) (with P(K) being the power set of K), and we define the overlap graph
O(G,C,K,F) as follows. The vertices of this graph are the elements of C, and two
elements c1, c2 ∈ C are connected by an edge if there exists g ∈ G and F ∈ F such
that
gF ⊂ c1K ∩ c2K.
Additionally, the second order Re´nyi entropy H2(p) is defined as
H2(p) = − ln
(∑
a∈A
p2a
)
.
We remark that as a result of our nontriviality assumption on p, we always have
H2(p) > 0. Additionally, we note that the choice of the natural logarithm here is
arbitrary. In fact, Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 are independent of the choice of base, since
their statements only ever refer to ratios of logarithms.
We consider the objects A, p, {Gn}, {Cn}, {Kn}, and {µnp} to be defined as in
the previous section. Since our primary goal is to consider the asymptotic regime
in which the size of the pattern to be reconstructed tends to infinity, we require
that
(G1) lim
n→∞
|CnKn| =∞.
For our general identifiability result, we also require the existence of a sequence of
sets of overlap shapes {Fn}, with Fn ⊂ P(Kn), satisfying the following assumptions.
The first identifiability condition is
(I1) ∀n≫ 0, O(Gn, Cn,Kn,Fn) is connected,
where ∀n ≫ 0 denotes “for all large enough n.” This condition ensures that
the reads can be organized into a single connected component based on their Fn-
overlaps. Our next identifiability condition is
(I2) lim
n→∞
ln(|Fn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = 0.
We remark |Fn| denotes the number of sets in the collection Fn, i.e., the number
of overlap shapes. Although the sequence of overlap shapes can increase in size to
infinity, condition (I2) guarantees that this growth is controlled. This assumption
is discussed in further detail in Section 4. Our final identifiability condition is
(I3) ∃ǫ > 0, ∀n≫ 0, ∀F ∈ Fn, |F | ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln
(|CnKn|).
This condition (together with condition (I1)) guarantees that there are sufficiently
large overlapping regions between the reads. We may now state our main identifia-
bility result, which we prove in Section 4.
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Theorem 1.1. Let A, p, {Gn}, {Cn}, {Kn}, and {µnp} be as above, and suppose
that (G1) is satisfied. If there exists a sequence {Fn} such that Fn ⊂ P(Kn) and
conditions (I1), (I2), and (I3) are satisfied, then identifiability holds a.a.s.
Informally, this theorem states that if the collection of read positions {cK : c ∈
C} has sufficiently large and regular overlapping regions, then the probability of
drawing an identifiable pattern is large (tending to one asymptotically).
We now turn our attention to the statement of our main non-identifiability result.
The basis for this result is that if a pattern has a certain type of subpattern called a
blocking configuration, then it is impossible to determine the original pattern from
its reads, i.e., the pattern is non-identifiable. In this work we focus on blocking
configurations that arise from repeated shapes called shells. A shell around an
element a ∈ CK is defined as the set (C ∩ aK−1)K \ {a}. One should imagine this
set as a generalization of a symmetric hypercube in Zd with the center removed
(hence the term “shell”). We also say the shell type at a is the set a−1C ∩K−1; see
Section 5 for a more detailed discussion of shells and shell types. For any E ⊂ CK,
let IE be the collection of shell types that appear for elements a ∈ E, and note that
|IE | is the number of shell types associated to E.
We consider the objects A, p, {Gn}, {Cn}, {Kn}, and {µnp} as in the previ-
ous section. As before, we are interested in the asymptotic regime in which (G1)
holds. For our general non-identifiability result, we require the existence of a se-
quence {Bn}, with Bn ⊂ CnKn, satisfying the following assumptions. The first
non-identifiability condition is
(N1) lim
n→∞
ln(|IBn |)
ln(|CnKn|) = 0.
This condition asserts that the number of shell types represented in Bn cannot grow
too quickly. Our second non-identifiability condition is
(N2) lim
n→∞
ln(|Bn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = 1.
This condition ensures that Bn is sufficiently large. For our last condition, we
require
(N3) ∃ǫ > 0, ∀n≫ 0, |K−1n Kn| ≤ (1− ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln
(|CnKn|).
This condition guarantees that all shells (which must be contained in a translate of
K−1n Kn) are sufficiently small. The following theorem is our main non-identifiability
result. Its proof appears in Section 5.
Theorem 1.2. Let A, p, {Gn}, {Cn}, {Kn}, and {µnp} be as above such that (G1)
is satisfied. Suppose there exists a sequence {Bn} with Bn ⊂ CnKn such that (N1)
and (N2) are satisfied. Further, suppose (N3). Then non-identifiability holds a.a.s.
This result states that if the read shape is small enough and there is a large
enough set of positions in CnKn with relatively few associated shell types, then
the probability of drawing an identifiable pattern is low (tending to zero asymptot-
ically).
Remark 1.1. The appearance of conditions (I3) and (N3) in our results suggests
that there may be some critical phenomenon that arises for shotgun identification
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problems on groups. In particular, consider the constant
λc =
2
H2(p)
.
Then condition (I3) ensures that |Kn|/ ln(|CnKn|) > λc, whereas condition (N3)
guarantees that |Kn|/ ln(|CnKn|) < λc. Thus, our results suggest that (under
appropriate regularity conditions) λc might serve as a kind of critical value for the
ratio |Kn|/ ln(|CnKn|). In other words, our results suggest the heuristic that if
the ratio |Kn|/ ln(|CnKn|) is less than λc, then non-identifiability occurs with high
probability, and if the ratio is greater than λc, then identifiability occurs with high
probability. This phenomenon has been observed previously for G = Z [13] and
conjectured for G = Zd [11]. See Sections 6.1 and 7 for additional discussion.
1.2. Examples. Here we describe several applications of our main results to illus-
trate how they may be used in various settings. The proofs of these statements
appear in Section 6.
1.2.1. Hypercubes in Zd with sparse center sets. In our first example, we consider
the d-dimensional integer lattice Zd. When d = 1, one may imagine performing
reconstruction on a string of characters, as is the case for DNA sequencing. When
d = 2, one may imagine trying to reconstruct a pattern on a grid of points in the
plane, as might be the case with images. We present our results for this example
with arbitrary d ∈ N. We let {Gn} be defined as Gn = (Zd,+). We then consider
three sequences of natural numbers {mn},{rn}, and {ℓn}, where {mn} tends to
infinity and {ℓn/rn} tends to zero. The sequence of center sets {Cn} is then defined
by setting Cn = ℓn ·[0,mn]d ⊂ Zd, i.e., each Cn is a regular grid ofmdn points spaced
ℓn units apart.
With {Kn} defined as Kn = [0, rn − 1]d ⊂ Zd (so that the reads are hypercubes
in Zd of side length rn), we let Rn = mnℓn + rn, which results in CnKn being a
hypercube of side length Rn. In this context, we are mainly interested in the ques-
tion, how large must the reads be (parameterized by rn) in terms of the observable
region (parameterized by Rn) in order to have identifiability with high probabil-
ity? The following corollary of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 gives our identifiability and
non-identifiability results for this example.
Corollary 1.3. If there exists some ǫ > 0 such that for all large n,
rdn ≥ (1 + ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(Rn),
then identifiability occurs a.a.s. On the other hand, if there exists some ǫ > 0 such
that for all large n,
rdn ≤ (1− ǫ)
d
2d−1H2(p)
ln(Rn),
then non-identifiability occurs a.a.s.
In the special case where ℓn = 1, this corollary recovers existing results from
previous work [11, 13]. The case ℓn > 1 may be viewed as allowing some sparsity
in the observations. See Section 6.1 for additional discussion.
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1.2.2. General read shapes in Zd. Next we consider general read shapes in Zd. We
take the center set Cn to be the hypercube [0, n−1]d ⊂ Zd, and we seek conditions on
the sequence of read shapes {Kn} that guarantee identifiability or non-identifiability
a.a.s.
In order to state our identifiability result, we first define the 1-interior of F ⊂ G,
denoted by int1 F , by setting
int1 F =
⋂
u
(
F ∩ uF ∩ u−1F ),
where the intersection ranges over the standard basis vectors u in Zd. For our
non-identifiability result, we define the diameter of F ⊂ G, denoted by diam(F ),
by setting
diam(F ) = sup
{‖a−1b‖∞ : a, b ∈ F},
where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the standard ℓ∞ norm on Rd. We now state our results for
this example.
Corollary 1.4. If
lim
n→∞
| int1Kn|
|Kn| = 1,
and for all large n,
|Kn| ≥ 4d
H2(p)
ln(n),
then identifiability occurs a.a.s. On the other hand, if
lim
n→∞
diam(Kn)
n
= 0,
and for some ǫ > 0 and all large n,
|K−1n Kn| ≤ (1− ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(n),
then non-identifiability occurs a.a.s.
This corollary gives that if the read shape is sufficiently large and has relatively
large 1-interior, then identifiability occurs with high probability. On the other hand,
if the read shape is sufficiently small and not too spread out (in the sense that its
diameter is small enough), then non-identifiability occurs with high probability.
1.2.3. Finitely generated groups. In our last family of examples, we consider the
setting of finitely generated groups. Let T be a finite symmetric set of generators of
G, and define Ti to be the closed ball of radius i around the identity with respect to
the standard word metric defined by T , i.e., Ti is the set of elements g ∈ G such that
g = t1 . . . tj for some j ≤ i and t1, . . . , tj ∈ T . Let γ(n) = |Tn| be the growth rate
function of the group G with generating set T , and consider sequences of natural
numbers {Rn} and {rn} with Rn > rn. We take the center set Cn to be TRn−rn ,
and we take the read shape Kn to be Trn , which makes the observable region
CnKn = TRn . In this setting, we would like to understand how the read radius rn
and the observable radius Rn affect the probability of identifiability. Interestingly,
the answer depends on the growth rate function of the group.
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Corollary 1.5. If there exists some ǫ > 0 such that for all large n,
γ(rn − 1) ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rn)),
then identifiability occurs a.a.s. On the other hand, if there exists some ǫ > 0 such
that for all large n,
γ(2rn) ≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rn)),
then non-identifiability occurs a.a.s.
In short, if the read radius rn is large enough relative to the observable radius
Rn (in the sense that the first inequality in corollary is satisfied), then we have
identifiability with high probability. However, if the read radius rn is sufficiently
small relative to the observable radius Rn (in the sense that the second inequality
in the corollary is satisfied), then non-identifiability occurs with high probability.
Remark 1.2. For a finitely generated group G with polynomial growth of degree
d, the previous corollary gives that if rn = ω
(
d
√
ln(Rn)
)
, then identifiability holds
a.a.s., and if rn = o
(
d
√
ln(Rn)
)
, then non-identifiability holds a.a.s. Similarly, for
a finitely generated group G with exponential growth, the previous corollary gives
that if rn = ω
(
ln(Rn)
)
, then identifiability occurs a.a.s., and if rn = o
(
ln(Rn)
)
, then
non-identifiability occurs a.a.s. Additionally, if one has more precise information
about the growth rate function of the group G, then the previous corollary may be
used to deduce sharper results about identifiability and non-identifiability.
1.3. Related work. The approach to DNA sequencing now known as shotgun se-
quencing has been used in genomics for decades. See the review [8] for a detailed
description of this methodology from the biological perspective, along with original
references. In complementary work, the mathematical analysis of shotgun sequenc-
ing has also been studied over many years. For early work in this direction, see [9].
For more recent results, see [13] and references therein.
The mathematical problem of shotgun assembly of DNA sequences was general-
ized substantially by Mossel and Ross [11]. In their formulation, one observes the
r-neighborhoods of the vertices of a labeled graph (for some radius r) and attempts
to reconstruct the graph (up to an appropriate notion of isomorphism). The case of
DNA sequences can be recovered by considering line graphs. They established de-
tailed results for certain classes of graphs, including the natural (nearest-neighbor)
graph associated to d-dimensional integer lattices Zd. We discuss this work in more
detail and compare it with our results in Section 6.1. More recent work in this direc-
tion has considered shotgun assembly of random graphs [12] and shotgun assembly
of random jigsaw puzzles [4].
Substantial attention has been devoted to understanding specific algorithms for
shotgun DNA sequencing; see the reviews [10, 15]. Recent work on jigsaw perco-
lation [3, 5, 7] provides expected time complexity bounds for solving graph-based
jigsaw puzzles using a randomized algorithm. By viewing the graph-based jigsaw
puzzle as a shotgun reconstruction problem, the results on jigsaw percolation can be
seen to provide an analysis of certain shotgun reconstruction algorithms on graphs.
Although we do not pursue algorithmic aspects of shotgun reconstruction on groups
in this work, we view it as an interesting avenue for future work.
Finally, we note that the shotgun identification problem on groups is related to
a topic known as synchronization problems over groups. In such problems, one is
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given an index set S and a collection of some group elements gu,v, with u, v ∈ S, and
one would like to estimate a collection of group elements (gu)u∈S such that gu,v =
gug
−1
v . These problems have been considered from a wide variety perspectives,
including applied [14, 16], geometric [6], and probabilistic [1]. Although we do not
address synchronization problems directly in this work, we note that one may derive
a type of synchronization problem from the shotgun identification problem: let S
be a collection of reads, and let gu,v be defined as the group translation of read u
that has maximal overlap with read v. In future work it might be interesting to
analyze the relationship between these problems more closely.
1.4. Overview. In Section 2, we present the necessary background and notation.
Section 3 contains statements and proofs of the basic probabilistic tools that we
use to prove our main results. In Section 4 we prove our main identifiability result,
Theorem 1.1, and in Section 5 we prove our main non-identifiability result, Theorem
1.2. In Section 6, we apply these theorems to some families of examples. Finally,
in Section 7 we discuss possible directions for future research.
2. Background and notation
2.1. Basic notation. Here and throughout the paper we assume that G is a count-
able group, A is a finite set, called the alphabet, C is a finite nonempty subset of
G, and K is a finite nonempty subset of G. We endow A with the discrete topology
and AG with the product topology, which makes AG into a compact metrizable
space. Then we endow AG with the Borel σ-algebra and suppress this choice in our
notation.
For g ∈ G and A ⊂ G, we let gA = {ga : a ∈ A}. Additionally, we say that two
subsets A and B of G are translates (of each other) if there is some g ∈ G such that
A = gB. Further, we may also “invert” a subset with the notation A−1 = {a−1 :
a ∈ A}, and for two subsets A,B ⊂ G, we let AB = {ab : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. We let |E|
denote the cardinality of any finite set E, and note that for any g ∈ G and A ⊂ G,
we have |gA| = |A|. Lastly, for any element g ∈ G, we let ord(g) denote the order
of the element g, and we let 〈g〉 denote the cyclic group generated by g.
2.2. Patterns, reads, and identifiability. We now introduce the notions of pat-
terns, reads, and identifiability, all of which are used throughout the remainder of
the paper.
Definition 2.1. Let F ⊂ G. Any element w ∈ AF is called a pattern, and we may
say that the pattern w ∈ AF has shape F .
We view patterns with shape F as a function from F to A. For ease of notation,
if w ∈ AF and E ⊂ F , then we let w(E) = w|E denote the restriction of w to the
shape E. For any finite shape F ⊂ G and any pattern w with shape F , we define
the associated cylinder set,
[w] =
{
x ∈ AG : x(F ) = w
}
.
Any such cylinder set is a clopen subset of AG, and we remind the reader that the
clopen subsets of AG generate the product topology and the Borel σ-algebra on
AG.
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For any F ⊂ G, pattern w ∈ AF , and g ∈ G, we define the function σg : AF →
Ag−1F by the rule
σg(w)(h) = w(gh), ∀h ∈ g−1F.
We remark that for any g ∈ G, the map σg : AG → AG is a homeomorphism. Also,
we note that the collection {σg}g∈G defines a right group action on AG, meaning
that it satisfies the composition rule σg◦σh = σhg (as opposed to the more standard
composition rule σg ◦ σh = σgh of left group actions). This right group action is
equivalent to the usual (left) group action of the opposite group Gop. However, in
this work we do not use any properties of σ as a group action; instead, we simply
use this notation to refer to various translates of patterns.
For any finite set F , we let MS(F ) denote the set of all multi-sets of elements
of F . We now give a proper definition of the read operator.
Definition 2.2. For any w ∈ ACK , we define the multi-set
RC,K(w) =
{
σc(w)(K) : c ∈ C}.
Note that RC,K defines a map RC,K : ACK → MS(AK), which we call the read
operator. Furthermore, any element of RC,K(w) is called a read.
Next we say precisely what it means for a pattern to be identifiable.
Definition 2.3. Let w ∈ ACK . The identifiability class of w, denoted C(w), is the
set of patterns that are equal to w after a group translation that preserves the set
of centers:
C(w) =
{
v ∈ ACK : ∃g ∈ G such that gC = C and σg(v) = w
}
.
Furthermore, a pattern w ∈ ACK is (C,K)-identifiable (or just identifiable) if
R−1C,K
(RC,K(w)) = C(w),
where RC,K : ACK → MS(AK) is the read operator and R−1C,K is its set inverse
function.
In other words, w is identifiable if the only other patterns from ACK with the
same multi-set of reads are translations of w by an element that preserves the
set of centers. The following lemma provides a useful characterization of when
RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′) for two patterns w,w′ ∈ ACK .
Lemma 2.4. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, and let w,w′ ∈ ACK . Then
RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′) if and only if there exists a permutation φ : C → C such that
∀c ∈ C,
σc(w)(K) = σφ(c)(w′)(K).
Proof. Assume RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′). For u ∈ AK , let nu denote the number of
times that u appears in RC,K(w). Then define three sets:
S1 = {(u, c) : u ∈ AK , c ∈ C, σc(w)(K) = u}
S2 = {(u, i) : u ∈ AK , 1 ≤ i ≤ nu}
S3 = {(u, c) : u ∈ AK , c ∈ C, σc(w′)(K) = u}.
By definition of RC,K(w), there is a bijection φ1 : S1 → S2, and similarly there
is a bijection φ2 : S3 → S2. Additionally, since each center gives rise to exactly
one element of S1 and one element of S3 there are bijections φ3 : C → S1 and
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φ4 : C → S3. Then the desired permutation is given by φ : C → C, where
φ = φ−14 ◦ φ−12 ◦ φ1 ◦ φ3.
The reverse implication is clear from the definitions. 
With this characterization, we can prove that one of the set containments re-
quired for identifiability is always true. Indeed, any pattern in the identifiability
class of w must have the same multi-set of reads as w. We record this fact in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose G is a group, C,K ⊂ G, and w ∈ ACK . Then
C(w) ⊂ R−1C,K
(RC,K(w)),
and therefore if
R−1C,K
(RC,K(w)) ⊂ C(w),
then w is identifiable.
Proof. Let v ∈ C(w), i.e., there exists g ∈ G such that gC = C, and σg(v) = w.
We wish to show that RC,K(w) = RC,K(v). To start, we define φ : C → C by
φ(c) = gc. This is clearly a permutation of C, since C = gC. Then, letting c ∈ C
and k ∈ K, we have that
σc(w)(k) = w(ck) = σg(v)(ck) = σgc(v)(k) = σφ(c)(v)(k),
and therefore σc(w)(K) = σφ(c)(v)(K). Then by Lemma 2.4, we conclude that
RC,K(w) = RC,K(v), as desired. 
2.3. Probability vectors and relevant properties. Here we introduce a family
of complexity measures for discrete probability distributions, which will be used
throughout this work. For a natural number m, we let
∆m =
{
p = (p1, . . . , pm) ∈ [0, 1]m :
m∑
k=1
pk = 1
}
.
We use the same notation for the set of probability vectors indexed by any alphabet
A with |A| = m.
Definition 2.6. Let p be a probability vector on the finite alphabet A. For any
natural number i, we define the function πi : ∆
|A| → (0, 1] as
πi(p) =
∑
a∈A
pia.
We note that the second order Re´nyi entropy can be written in terms of π2(p):
H2(p) = − ln
(
π2(p)
)
.
Next we require bounds on πi(p) in terms of π2(p). We use the standard ℓ
p norm
on Rm, which we denote by ‖·‖p, and which satisfies the elementary property that
if 1 ≤ p ≤ q and x ∈ Rm, then ‖x‖q ≤ ‖x‖p. We include proofs of the following
two lemmas for completeness.
Lemma 2.7. Let p be a probability vector, and let i ≥ 2 be a natural number. Then
πi(p) ≤ π2(p) i2 .
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Proof. By the elementary property mentioned above, we have that ‖p‖i ≤ ‖p‖2 for
any i ≥ 2, and then
πi(p) =
(
πi(p)
1
i
)i
= (‖p‖i)i ≤ (‖p‖2)i =
(
π2(p)
1
2
)i
= π2(p)
i
2 .

Lemma 2.8. Let A be a finite set, and let p = (pa)a∈A be a probability vector on
A. Then for any natural number i ≥ 2,
πi(p) ≥ π2(p)i−1.
Proof. Suppose X is a real-valued random variable that takes the value pa with
probability pa, i.e., P(X = pa) = pa. Let φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be defined as φ(x) = xi−1.
Since i ≥ 2, φ is convex and we can apply Jensen’s Inequality to get that
φ(E[X ]) ≤ E[φ(X)].
We now derive an expression for each side of this inequality. For the left hand side,
φ(E[X ]) = φ
(∑
a∈A
pa · pa
)
= φ
(
π2(p)
)
= π2(p)
i−1.
For the right hand side, we have
E[φ(X)] =
∑
a∈A
φ(pa) · pa =
∑
a∈A
pia = πi(p).
Combining the previous three displays yields the desired result. 
3. Probabilistic framework and repeats in patterns
In this section we develop some basic probabilistic tools that will be used in
later sections. Throughout this section, we suppose that we have a fixed shotgun
identification problem on a group, where A, p, G, C, and K are as in Section 2.
Here and throughout the rest of this work, we define µp to be the product measure
pG, which extends the definition of µp from CK (as it was defined in Section 1) to
all of G. We remind the reader that the main event of interest in this work is IC,K ,
which is referred to as identifiability and is formally defined as
IC,K =
{
x ∈ AG : x(CK) is (C,K)-identifiable
}
=
⋃
w∈ACK
w is (C,K)-identifiable
[w].
The main purpose of this section is to prove Theorem 3.1, which gives bounds on
the probability that a randomly drawn pattern contains a repeated subpattern, and
Theorem 3.2, which gives the probability that a randomly drawn pattern contains n
disjoint repeated subpatterns. The notion of a repeat is formally defined later in this
section. We remark that many of the intermediate results in this section are true in
greater generality than is stated here, but we do not pursue these generalizations
as they are not used later in this work.
Let us begin by recording two elementary facts regarding product measures for
future reference. First, suppose A is a finite set and p is a probability vector indexed
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byA. Further suppose thatG is a countable set and µp = pG is the product measure
on AG. Then for any finite shape F ⊂ G and any pattern w ∈ AF , we have that
(3.1) µp([w]) =
∏
a∈A
(pa)
|{v∈F :w(v)=a}|.
Next, for any finite set F ⊂ G, we let S(F ) denote the σ-algebra generated by all
cylinder sets on F , i.e., S(F ) consists of all events that can be written as a union of
some cylinder sets defined by patterns with shape F . Now suppose that A1, . . . , An
are finite subsets of G and for each k = 1, . . . , n, we have events Ek ∈ S(Ak). If
the sets A1, . . . , An are pairwise disjoint, then the collection {Ek}nk=1 is mutually
independent, and in particular
(3.2) µp
(
n⋂
k=1
Ek
)
=
n∏
k=1
µp(Ek).
3.1. Repeated patterns. In this section we turn our attention to estimating the
probability of repeated patterns. First we give a precise definition of a repeat.
Definition 3.1. Let A ⊂ G be finite, and let g ∈ G. We say that w ∈ AA∪gA
has an (A; g)-repeat if for each h ∈ A we have w(h) = w(gh). Furthermore, we let
R(A; g) denote the event that a randomly drawn configuration has an (A; g)-repeat:
R(A; g) =
⋃
w∈AA∪gA
w has an (A; g)-repeat
[w].
Now we define some additional notation and terminology that is helpful in an-
alyzing repeats. In particular, we will define an equivalence relation on A ∪ gA
such that if a pattern w has an (A; g)-repeat and h0 is equivalent to h1, then
w(h0) = w(h1). Let A ⊂ G be finite, g ∈ G, and F = A ∪ gA. Define the relation
≺g on F by setting u ≺g v if u ∈ A and v = gu. Note the following two facts:
(i) if u1 ≺g v and u2 ≺g v, then gu1 = v = gu2, and thus u1 = u2;
(ii) if u ≺g v1 and u ≺g v2, then v1 = gu = v2, and thus v1 = v2.
Now, let ∼g be the symmetric, transitive closure of ≺g, which is then an equivalence
relation on F . Consider any u ∼g v ∈ F . If u = v, then v = g0u. Otherwise, by
the definition of ∼g as the symmetric, transitive closure of ≺g, together with the
facts (i) and (ii), we see that (swapping u and v if necessary) for some n ∈ N, there
must be w1, w2, . . . , wn−1 ∈ A such that
u ≺g w1 ≺g w2 ≺g · · · ≺g wn−1 ≺g v.
Note this also covers the case that u ≺g v. By definition, this means that v = gnu,
and ∀k ∈ [1, n), we have wk = gku ∈ A.
As ∼g is an equivalence relation, it describes a partition of F into equivalence
classes. We let O(A; g) denote this set of equivalence classes and call its elements or-
bits. This relation plays a role in our analysis of repeated patterns via the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose A ⊂ G is finite, g ∈ G, and F = A ∪ gA. For each
x ∈ R(A; g) and u, v ∈ F , if u ∼g v, then x(u) = x(v).
Proof. Let x ∈ R(A; g). Suppose u ∼g v. First, if u = v, then clearly x(u) = x(v).
Now consider the case u 6= v. By interchanging the role of u and v if necessary,
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we have that v = gnu for some n ≥ 1 and gku ∈ A for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Since
x ∈ R(A; g), for each k = 1, . . . , n, we have x(gku) = x(ggk−1u) = x(gk−1u).
Chaining these equalities together, we get x(v) = x(gnu) = x(gn−1u) = · · · = x(u),
which concludes the proof. 
The next lemma gives an expression for the probability of the event R(A; g) in
terms of these equivalence classes.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose A ⊂ G is finite and g ∈ G. Then
µp
(R(A; g)) = ∏
O∈O(A;g)
π|O|(p).
Proof. For an equivalence class O ∈ O(A; g), let E(O, a) denote the event that
every element of O is labeled by the symbol a, i.e., E(O, a) = {x ∈ AG : ∀u ∈
O, x(u) = a}. First, observe that for each equivalence class O, we have that
µp
(
E(O, a)
)
= (pa)
|O|,
where we have used (3.1). Next, let E(O) =
⋃
a∈AE(O, a), and note that this is a
disjoint union. Hence we have that
(3.3) µp
(
E(O)
)
=
∑
a∈A
µp
(
E(O, a)
)
=
∑
a∈A
(pa)
|O| = π|O|(p).
Now observe that O(A; g) gives a partition of F = A ∪ gA into equivalence classes.
In particular, these equivalence classes are all pairwise disjoint, and then by (3.2)
and the previous display, we have that
µp

 ⋂
O∈O(A;g)
E(O)

 = ∏
O∈O(A;g)
µp
(
E(O)
)
=
∏
O∈O(A;g)
π|O|(p).
Let us now check that
R(A; g) =
⋂
O∈O(A;g)
E(O).
First, if x ∈ R(A; g), then x ∈ E(O) for each O ∈ O(A; g) by Lemma 3.2. Hence
R(A; g) is contained in the intersection. For the reverse inclusion, if x ∈ E(O) for
each O ∈ O(A; g), then we clearly have that x(h) = x(gh) for all h ∈ A, which
implies that x ∈ R(A; g). Finally, combining the two previous displays completes
the proof of the lemma. 
The following lemma is used below to give bounds on the probability of R(A; g)
that do not depend on the particular orbit structure O(A; g).
Lemma 3.4. Suppose A ⊂ G and g ∈ G with g 6= e. Then
|A| ≤
∑
O∈O(A;g)
|O| and
∑
O∈O(A;g)
(|O| − 1) ≤ |A|.
Proof. Let F = A ∪ gA. Since O(A; g) is a partition of F and A ⊂ F , we clearly
have ∑
O∈O(A;g)
|O| = |F | ≥ |A|,
which proves the first inequality in the statement of the lemma.
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For the second inequality, note that
(3.4)
∑
O∈O(A;g)
(|O| − 1) =

 ∑
O∈O(A;g)
|O|

 − |O(A; g)| = |F | − |O(A; g)|.
Let us now show that if u, v ∈ F \ gA and u 6= v, then u is not equivalent
to v. Suppose for contradiction that u, v ∈ F \ gA, u 6= v, and u ∼g v. By
interchanging the roles of u and v if necessary, we may assume without loss of
generality that v = gnu for some n ≥ 0 and gku ∈ A for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Since
u 6= v, we must have gn 6= e, and therefore n ≥ 1. Then gn−1u ∈ A, and we have
v = gnu = g(gn−1u) ∈ gA, which contradicts the assumption that v /∈ gA.
By the previous paragraph, we see that if u, v ∈ F \ gA and u 6= v, then u is not
equivalent to v. As a result, the map from F \ gA to O(A; g) that sends u to the
orbit containing u is an injection, and therefore |F \ gA| ≤ |O(A; g)|. Combining
this inequality with (3.4) gives∑
O∈O(A;g)
(|O| − 1) = |F | − |O(A; g)| ≤ |F | − |F \ gA| = |F \ (F \ gA)| = |gA| = |A|,
which completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now we give bounds on µp
(R(A; g)) that depend only on |A| and π2(p).
Theorem 3.1. Let G be a countable group, and let p be a probability vector. Then
for any finite A ⊂ G and any g ∈ G,
π2(p)
|A| ≤ µp
(R(A; g)) ≤ π2(p) 12 |A|.
Proof. Let G, p, A, and g be as above. By Lemma 3.3, we have
(3.5) µp
(R(A; g)) = ∏
O∈O(A;g)
π|O|(p).
Let us first establish the upper bound. By (3.5) and Lemmas 2.7 and 3.4, we have
µp
(R(A; g)) = ∏
O∈O(A;g)
π|O|(p) ≤
∏
O∈O(A;g)
π2(p)
1
2 |O|
= π2(p)
1
2
∑
O∈O(A;g) |O| ≤ π2(p) 12 |A|.
Now we establish the lower bound. By (3.5) and Lemmas 2.8 and 3.4, we have
µp
(R(A; g)) = ∏
O∈O(A;g)
π|O|(p) ≥
∏
O∈O(A;g)
π2(p)
|O|−1
= π2(p)
∑
O∈O(A;g)(|O|−1) ≥ π2(p)|A|.
This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
In our proofs in Section 5, we also require estimates regarding the probability
that a single pattern is repeated multiple times on disjoint shapes. Toward that end,
we extend our original notation. Let A ⊂ G be a finite set, let g1, . . . , gn ∈ G with
g1 = e, and let F = ∪nk=1gkA. A pattern w ∈ AF has an (A; g2, . . . , gn)-repeat if for
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each h ∈ A, there is a symbol ah such that w(gkh) = ah for all k = 1, . . . , n. Now
let R(A; g2, . . . , gn) denote the event that x ∈ AG has an (A; g2, . . . , gn)-repeat, i.e.,
R(A; g2, . . . , gn) =
⋃
w∈AF
w has an (A; g2, . . . , gn)-repeat
[w].
We remark that it is possible to give an exact expression for the probability of
this event regardless of the choice of g2, . . . , gn; however, we do not require such a
general result. We only require an exact probability when the collection {gkA}nk=1
is mutually disjoint, which is far easier to establish. The following theorem gives
our second main result for the section.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose A ⊂ G is finite, g1, . . . , gn ∈ G with g1 = e, and the
collection {gkA}nk=1 is mutually disjoint. Then
µp
(R(A; g2, . . . , gn)) = πn(p)|A|.
Proof. Let A and g1, . . . , gn be as in the statement of the theorem. Let F =
∪nk=1gkA. For each h ∈ A, let O(h) = {gkh : 1 ≤ k ≤ n}, and let O(A; g2, . . . , gn) =
{O(h) : h ∈ A}. Since {gkA}k=1 is mutually disjoint, we have that |O(h)| = n
for each h ∈ A, and furthermore O(A; g2, . . . , gn) is a partition of F . For O ∈
O(A; g2, . . . , gn) and a ∈ A, let E(O, a) = {x ∈ AG : ∀h ∈ O, x(h) = a}. Next let
E(O) = ∪a∈AE(O, a). Then
µp
(
E(O, a)
)
= (pa)
|O| = (pa)
n,
and therefore
µp
(
E(O)
)
=
∑
a∈A
µp
(
E(O, a)
)
=
∑
a∈A
(pa)
n = πn(p).
Since each map h 7→ gkh is a bijection from A to gkA, we also have that the map
h 7→ O(h) is a bijection from A to O(A; g2, . . . , gn). Hence |O(A; g2, . . . , gn)| = |A|.
Additionally, note that
R(A; g2, . . . , gn) =
⋂
O∈O(A;g2,...,gn)
E(O).
Combining all of these facts, we see that
µp
(R(A; g2, . . . , gn)) = µp

 ⋂
O∈O(A;g2,...,gn)
E(O)


=
∏
O∈O(A;g2,...,gn)
µp
(
E(O)
)
=
∏
O∈O(A;g2,...,gn)
πn(p)
= πn(p)
|O(A;g2,...,gn)|
= πn(p)
|A|,
as desired. 
We note that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 exactly recover Lemma 11 in [13] for the case
of DNA sequences, and similar results appear in [11] in the case of d-dimensional
integer lattices.
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4. Identifiability results
In this section we aim to prove Theorem 1.1, which establishes sufficient con-
ditions for identifiability a.a.s. The general idea is that if the reads can be orga-
nized into a connected graph with sufficiently large and regular overlapping regions
between reads connected by an edge, then identifiability should occur with high
probability. In fact, we show that under the hypotheses of the theorem, the over-
lapping regions all have unique labels with high probability and this unique labeling
condition implies identifiability. In the next section, we establish some combinato-
rial lemmas, including Lemma 4.3, which shows that the unique labeling condition
implies identifiability. In Section 4.2 we find a lower bound on the probability of
identifiability by estimating the probability of satisfying the unique labeling condi-
tion. Finally, we use these results to prove Theorem 1.1 in Section 4.3.
4.1. Combinatorial results for identifiability. To begin our analysis, we recall
the definition of an overlap graph.
Definition 4.1. Let G be a group, and let C,K ⊂ G and F ⊂ P(K). The overlap
graph O = O(G,C,K,F) is the undirected graph with vertex set V (O) = C and
edge set
E(O) =
{
(c1, c2) ∈ C2 : ∃g ∈ G, ∃F ∈ F, gF ⊂ c1K ∩ c2K
}
.
The following lemma formalizes an intuitive property of overlap graphs: weaken-
ing the requirements for including edges cannot disconnect an overlap graph. We
use it in the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Lemma 4.2. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, let F ⊂ P(K) and suppose that
is connected. If F′ ⊂ P(K) and ∀F ∈ F, ∃F ′ ∈ F′ such that F ′ ⊂ F , then
O(G,C,K,F′) is connected.
Proof. Let O′ = O(G,C,K,F′), and consider some edge (c1, c2) ∈ E(O). Then
∃g ∈ G and ∃F ∈ F such that gF ⊂ c1K ∩ c2K. We also have by assumption that
∃F ′ ∈ F′ such that F ′ ⊂ F , and therefore gF ′ ⊂ gF and gF ′ ⊂ c1K ∩ c2K. Hence
(c1, c2) ∈ E(O′). Therefore, O is a subgraph of O′ containing all the vertices. Since
O is connected, O′ is connected. 
The next lemma provides a sufficient condition for identifiability. Informally, it
states that if a pattern has unique labels on all overlap regions, then the pattern is
identifiable. We note that an analogous lemma appears as [11, Lemma 2.4] in the
setting of graphs.
Lemma 4.3. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, and suppose there exists F ⊂ P(K)
such that ∅ /∈ F and O(G,C,K,F) is connected. Suppose that x ∈ AG has unique
patterns on all translates of each F ∈ F contained in CK, i.e., ∀g, h ∈ G, ∀F ∈ F,
if gF, hF ⊂ CK and σg(x)(F ) = σh(x)(F ), then g = h. Then x(CK) is (C,K)-
identifiable, i.e., x ∈ IC,K .
Proof. For simplicity, let O = O(G,C,K,F) and let w = x(CK), and then consider
some w′ ∈ ACK such that RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′). By Lemma 2.4, there exists a
permutation φ of C such that ∀c ∈ C, k ∈ K,
σc(w)(k) = σφ(c)(w′)(k).
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Take any c0 ∈ C, and let g1 = φ(c0)c−10 . Now define
T =
{
c ∈ C : φ(c) = g1c
}
.
Note that c0 ∈ T , since φ(c0) = φ(c0)c−10 c0 = g1c0, and thus T is non-empty. Also
T ⊂ C. We wish to show that φ(c) = g1c for all c ∈ C, or in other words, T = C.
First we establish the following statement.
Claim. Let t ∈ T and c ∈ C, and suppose that (φ(t), φ(c)) ∈ E(O). Then c ∈ T .
We now prove the claim. Let t ∈ T and c ∈ C, and suppose that (φ(t), φ(c)) ∈
E(O). By definition, we have that φ(t) = g1t, and letting g2 = φ(c)c−1g−11 , we
have φ(c) = g2g1c. We aim now to show that g2 = e. Since (φ(t), φ(c)) ∈ E(O),
there exists h ∈ G and F ∈ F such that
hF ⊂ φ(t)K ∩ φ(c)K.
Hence w′(hF ) appears in both w′(φ(t)K) and w′(φ(c)K).
First, we wish to show that the pattern w′(hF ) appears in the read w(tK),
which we do using the fact that hF ⊂ φ(t)K. In particular, we will show that
g−11 hF ⊂ tK, and w(g−11 hF ) is the same pattern as w′(hF ). Taking some f ∈ F ,
we have hf ∈ hF ⊂ φ(t)K, so we can find some k1 ∈ K such that hf = φ(t)k1,
which gives
w′(hf) = w′(φ(t)k1) = σ
φ(t)(w′)(k1).
Next, since t ∈ C and k1 ∈ K, we have that σt(w)(k1) = σφ(t)(w′)(k1), and
combining this fact with the previous display yields
w′(hf) = σφ(t)(w′)(k1) = σ
t(w)(k1) = w(tk1).
Since tk1 = g
−1
1 g1tk1 = g
−1
1 φ(t)k1 = g
−1
1 hf , we obtain that w
′(hf) = w(tk1) =
w(g−11 hf). Since f ∈ F was arbitrary, we have shown that ∀f ∈ F ,
w′(hf) = w(g−11 hf),
and thus σh(w′)(F ) = σg
−1
1 h(w)(F ).
Now we wish to show that the pattern w′(hF ) appears in the pattern w(cK),
which we do using the fact that hF ⊂ φ(c)K. In particular, we will show that
g−11 g
−1
2 hF ⊂ cK, and w(g−11 g−12 hF ) is the same pattern as w′(hF ). Taking some
f ∈ F , we have hf ∈ hF ⊂ φ(c)K, so we can find some k2 ∈ K such that
hf = φ(c)k2, which gives
w′(hf) = w′(φ(c)k2) = σ
φ(c)(w′)(k2).
Next, since c ∈ C and k2 ∈ K, we have that σc(w)(k2) = σφ(c)(w′)(k2), and
combining this fact with the previous display gives
w′(hf) = σφ(c)(w′)(k2) = σ
c(w)(k2) = w(ck2).
Since ck2 = (g2g1)
−1g2g1ck2 = g
−1
1 g
−1
2 φ(c)k2 = g
−1
1 g
−1
2 hf , we obtain that w
′(hf) =
w(ck2) = w(g
−1
1 g
−1
2 hf). Since f ∈ F was arbitrary, we have shown that ∀f ∈ F ,
w′(hf) = w(g−11 g
−1
2 hf),
and thus σh(w′)(F ) = σg
−1
1 g
−1
2 h(w)(F ).
By the conclusions of the two previous paragraphs, we have that
(4.1) σg
−1
1 h(w)(F ) = σh(w′)(F ) = σg
−1
1 g
−1
2 h(w)(F ).
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Since hF ⊂ φ(t)K = g1tK, we have g−11 hF ⊂ tK ⊂ CK, and since hF ⊂ φ(c)K =
g2g1cK, we have g
−1
1 g
−1
2 hF ⊂ cK ⊂ CK. Then by the uniqueness property as-
sumed in the lemma and (4.1), we obtain that
g−11 h = g
−1
1 g
−1
2 h.
After cancelling like terms, we see that g2 = e. As a result, we have
φ(c) = g2g1c = g1c,
and therefore c ∈ T . This concludes the proof of the claim.
Now consider any c ∈ C. Since O is connected, there must be some path between
φ(c0) and φ(c), with edges (φ(c0), φ(c1)), (φ(c1), φ(c2)), . . . , (φ(cn), φ(c)), where
c1, . . . , cn ∈ C. Since c0 ∈ T and (φ(c0), φ(c1)) ∈ E(O), the claim yields that
c1 ∈ T . Then, by applying the claim inductively, we conclude that c2, c3, . . . , cn ∈ T ,
and finally that c ∈ T . Thus, C ⊂ T , and therefore we obtain that T = C and
φ(C) = g1C.
Since φ is a permutation, we also know that φ(C) = C, and so C = g1C. Now
let h ∈ CK, and choose c ∈ C and k ∈ K such that h = ck. By the definition of φ
and the fact that φ(c) = g1c for all c ∈ C, we see that for any c ∈ C and k ∈ K,
we must have σc(w)(k) = σφ(c)(w′)(k) = σg1c(w′)(k), and then
w(h) = w(ck) = σc(w)(k) = σg1c(w′)(k) = σg1 (w′)(ck) = σg1 (w′)(h).
Since h ∈ CK was arbitrary, we conclude that σg1(w′) = w, and thus
w′ ∈ C(w).
Since w′ ∈ R−1C,K
(RC,K(w)) was arbitrary, we have shown that
R−1C,K
(RC,K(w)) ⊂ C(w).
Finally, by Lemma 2.5, we conclude that w = x(CK) is identifiable, and thus
x ∈ IC,K . 
The following elementary lemma provides a characterization of when two trans-
lates of a set overlap.
Lemma 4.4. Let G be a group, let g, h ∈ G, and let A ⊂ G. Then
gA ∩ hA 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ g ∈ hAA−1
Proof. Assuming gA ∩ hA is nonempty, we have some c ∈ gA and c ∈ hA. Then
there are some a1, a2 ∈ A such that c = ga1 = ha2, and therefore g = ha2a−11 .
Hence g ∈ hAA−1.
Assuming g ∈ hAA−1, we have some a1, a2 ∈ A such that g = ha2a−11 . Thus, we
have that ga1 = ha2. Letting x = ga1 = ha2, we clearly have that x = ga1 ∈ gA
and x = ha2 ∈ hA, and therefore gA ∩ hA 6= ∅. 
4.2. Bounding the probability of identifiability from below. Now we bound
the probability of identifiability from below using the sufficient condition given in
Lemma 4.3. The basic idea is to estimate the probability of having unique patterns
on all translates of the overlap shapes F ∈ F. Here we use the estimates on the
probability of repeats derived in Section 3.
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Lemma 4.5. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, let A be a finite alphabet, let p be
a probability vector on A, and let µp be the product measure pG on AG. If there
exists F ⊂ P(K) such that ∅ /∈ F and O(G,C,K,F) is connected, then
µp(IC,K) ≥ 1−
∑
F∈F
[
|CK|2π2(p)|F | + |CK||FF−1|π2(p) 12 |F |
]
.
Proof. For any F ∈ F, define the set
T (F ) = {g ∈ G : gF ⊂ CK}.
Then, for any two-element subset {a, b} of T (F ), we define an indicator random
variable 1Fa,b on the probability space (AG, µp) by the rule
1
F
a,b(x) =
{
1, x ∈ R(aF ; ba−1)
0, otherwise.
Recall that the event R(aF ; ba−1) contains all patterns x for which σa(x)(F ) =
σb(x)(F ). Now, letting T ∗(F ) denote the set of two-element subsets of T (F ) (mak-
ing |T ∗(F )| = (|T (F )|2 )), we define the random variable X by
X =
∑
F∈F
∑
{a,b}∈T∗(F )
1
F
a,b.
Note that X counts the number of translates of any F ∈ F in CK that are labeled
identically. In particular, if X = 0, then all translates of each F ∈ F in CK
are uniquely labeled (as in the hypotheses of Lemma 4.3). Thus, the additional
hypothesis that the overlap graph is connected gives that (X = 0) ⊂ IC,K by
Lemma 4.3. Hence, by monotonicity, we have
µp(IC,K) ≥ µp(X = 0) = 1− µp(X 6= 0).
Since X takes the value of a non-negative integer, the event that X 6= 0 is the same
as the event that X ≥ 1. Then, applying Markov’s Inequality, we get
(4.2) µp(IC,K) ≥ 1− µp(X ≥ 1) ≥ 1− E[X ].
Let us now focus on bounding E[X ] from above. We start by noting that
E[X ] =
∑
F∈F
∑
{a,b}∈T∗(F )
E
[
1
F
a,b
]
=
∑
F∈F
∑
{a,b}∈T∗(F )
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1)).
Next we partition T ∗(F ) into T ∗D(F ) and T
∗
I (F ), the disjoint and intersecting
sets respectively, defined as
T ∗D(F ) =
{
{a, b} ∈ T ∗(F ) : aF ∩ bF = ∅
}
and T ∗I (F ) = T
∗(F ) \ T ∗D(F ).
With this partition of T ∗(F ), we can rewrite E[X ] as
E[X ] =
∑
F∈F
∑
{a,b}∈T∗(F )
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1))
=
∑
F∈F

 ∑
{a,b}∈T∗D(F )
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1))+ ∑
{a,b}∈T∗I (F )
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1))

 .
For any {a, b} ∈ T ∗D(F ), since aF ∩ bF = ∅, Theorem 3.2 gives that
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1)) = π2(p)|aF | = π2(p)|F |.
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For any {a, b} ∈ T ∗I (F ), Theorem 3.1 gives that
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1)) ≤ π2(p) 12 |aF | = π2(p) 12 |F |.
By combining the three previous displays and simplifying, we see that
E[X ] =
∑
F∈F

 ∑
{a,b}∈T∗
D
(F )
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1))+ ∑
{a,b}∈T∗
I
(F )
µp
(R(aF ; ba−1))


≤
∑
F∈F

 ∑
{a,b}∈T∗
D
(F )
π2(p)
|F | +
∑
{a,b}∈T∗
I
(F )
π2(p)
1
2 |F |


=
∑
F∈F
[
|T ∗D(F )|π2(p)|F | + |T ∗I (F )|π2(p)
1
2 |F |
]
.
(4.3)
Let us find an upper bound for |T ∗D(F )|. By definition of T (F ), we have that
T (F )F ⊂ CK. Since each F ∈ F is nonempty, we also have that |T (F )| ≤ |T (F )F |,
and by definition, T ∗D(F ) ⊂ T ∗(F ). By combining these facts, we obtain
|T ∗D(F )| ≤ |T ∗(F )| =
(|T (F )|
2
)
≤ |T (F )|2 ≤ |T (F )F |2 ≤ |CK|2.
Let us now find an upper found on |T ∗I (F )|. Let a ∈ T (F ), and consider all
possible b ∈ T (F ) such that aF ∩ bF 6= ∅. By Lemma 4.4, we have that aF ∩ bF 6=
∅ ⇐⇒ b ∈ aFF−1, and thus, for any choice of a ∈ T (F ), the only choices for
b are in aFF−1. As a result, there are at most |aFF−1| = |FF−1| choices for b
given any choice of a. Furthermore, there are clearly at most |T (F )| choices for
a, which we can again bound by |T (F )| ≤ |T (F )F | ≤ |CK|. Thus, with at most
|CK| choices for a and at most |FF−1| corresponding choices for b, we see that
|T ∗I (F )| ≤ |CK||FF−1|.
Combining our bounds on |T ∗D(F )| and |T ∗I (F )| with (4.3), we get
E[X ] ≤
∑
F∈F
|T ∗D(F )|π2(p)|F | + |T ∗I (F )|π2(p)
1
2 |F |
≤
∑
F∈F
|CK|2π2(p)|F | + |CK||FF−1|π2(p) 12 |F |.
Then by (4.2) and the previous display, we obtain
µp(IC,K) ≥ 1− E[X ] ≥ 1−
∑
F∈F
[
|CK|2π2(p)|F | + |CK||FF−1|π2(p) 12 |F |
]
,
which completes the proof. 
4.3. Proof of Theorem 1.1. We are now prepared to prove Theorem 1.1, which
we restate for the reader’s convenience.
Theorem 1.1. Let A, p, {Gn}, {Cn}, {Kn}, and {µnp} be as in Section 1, and
suppose that limn |CnKn| = ∞ (G1). If there exists a sequence {Fn} such that
Fn ⊂ P(Kn) and such that
(I1) ∀n≫ 0, O(Gn, Cn,Kn,Fn) is connected,
(I2) limn
ln |Fn|
ln |CnKn|
= 0, and
(I3) ∃ǫ > 0 s.t. ∀n≫ 0, ∀F ∈ Fn we have |F | ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2H2(p) ln |CnKn|,
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then identifiability holds a.a.s.
Proof. First, consider N large enough that |CnKn| > 1 for all n ≥ N , and then let
α be some constant such that for every index n ≥ N ,
α >
1
ln(|CnKn|) + (1 + ǫ)
2
H2(p)
.
With this definition of α, we also have that
α ln(|CnKn|) > 1 + (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|),
and thus, for any index n ≥ N , we can find some integer βn such that
(1 + ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|) < βn ≤ α ln(|CnKn|).
Now, for each n ≥ N , we define another set of overlap shapes F¯n as follows. For
any n ≥ N , let F ∈ Fn. If
|F | ≤ α ln(|CnKn|),
then we include F in F¯n, and we note that |F | ≥ (1+ ǫ)2 ln(|CnKn|)/H2(p) by (I3).
Otherwise, arbitrarily choose a subset F¯ ⊂ F containing exactly βn elements, and
include F¯ in F¯n. Note that ∀n ≥ N, ∀F¯ ∈ F¯n, we have that
(4.4) (1 + ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|) ≤ |F¯ | ≤ α ln(|CnKn|).
Furthermore, ∀F¯ ∈ F¯n, there is some F ∈ Fn such that F¯ ⊂ F ⊂ Gn. Since
|CnKn| > 1, we must have that βn > 0, so we know that each F¯ is nonempty.
Therefore each O¯n = O(Gn, Cn,Kn, F¯n) is connected by Lemma 4.2.
Now consider a single index n ≥ N . Since each F ∈ F¯n is nonempty and each
O¯n is connected, Lemma 4.5 gives that
(4.5) µnp (ICn,Kn) ≥ 1−
∑
F¯∈F¯n
[
|CnKn|2π2(p)|F¯ | + |CnKn||F¯ F¯−1|π2(p) 12 |F¯ |
]
.
We now consider a single term in the sum. Using the lower bound on |F¯ | from (4.4),
we obtain that
|CnKn|2π2(p)|F¯ | = exp
(
2 ln(|CnKn|)
)
exp
(−|F¯ |H2(p))
≤ exp
(
2 ln(|CnKn|)− (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|)H2(p)
)
= exp
(−2ǫ ln(|CnKn|))
= |CnKn|−2ǫ.
Similarly, using both the upper and lower bounds on |F¯ | from (4.4), we see that
|CnKn||F¯ F¯−1|π2(p) 12 |F¯ | = |F¯ F¯−1| exp
(
ln(|CnKn|)
)
exp
(
−1
2
|F¯ |H2(p)
)
≤ |F¯ |2 exp
(
ln(|CnKn|)− 1
2
(1 + ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|)H2(p)
)
≤ α2 ln(|CnKn|)2 exp
(−ǫ ln(|CnKn|))
= α2 ln(|CnKn|)2|CnKn|−ǫ.
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Combining these two estimates with (4.5) gives that
µnp (ICn,Kn) ≥ 1−
∑
F∈F¯n
[|CnKn|−2ǫ + α2 ln(|CnKn|)2|CnKn|−ǫ]
= 1− |F¯n|
[
|CnKn|−2ǫ + α2 ln(|CnKn|)2|CnKn|−ǫ
]
= 1− |F¯n||CnKn|2ǫ − α
2 |F¯n| ln(|CnKn|)2
|CnKn|ǫ .
(4.6)
Note that we have |F¯n| = |Fn| by construction. Now by (I2), we have that
lim
n→∞
ln(|F¯n|)
ln(|CnKn|) = limn→∞
ln(|Fn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = 0.
Taking δ = ǫ/2, for all large enough n we have that
ln(|F¯n|)
ln(|CnKn|) ≤ δ,
which implies that |F¯n| ≤ |CnKn|δ. Using this estimate together with (4.6), we see
that
1 ≥ µnp (ICn,Kn) ≥ 1−
1
|CnKn|2ǫ−δ − α
2 ln(|CnKn|)2
|CnKn|ǫ−δ
= 1− 1|CnKn|3ǫ/2 − α
2 ln(|CnKn|)2
|CnKn|ǫ/2 .
Letting n tend to infinity and using that |CnKn| → ∞ by (G1), we obtain that
lim
n→∞
µnp (ICn,Kn) = 1,
which concludes the proof of the theorem. 
5. Non-Identifiability results
In this section we aim to prove Theorem 1.2, which establishes sufficient condi-
tions for non-identifiability a.a.s. Our approach to establishing non-identifiability
is to show that certain blocking configurations appear with high probability. To get
the general idea, imagine that a pattern w has two large subpatterns that are la-
beled identically except at their centers. The existence of these subpatterns would
prevent successful reconstruction, because there would be no way to use the in-
formation from the reads to determine how the centers should be labeled. Thus,
these subpatterns would serve as a blocking configuration. We note that analogous
considerations have been used in [13] and [11] to establish non-identifiability results
in the case G = Zd. In order to establish that such blocking configurations appear
with high probability, we employ a second moment argument.
In Section 5.1 we establish some combinatorial lemmas related to these blocking
configurations. The key result is Lemma 5.7, which shows that if a pattern contains
a blocking configuration, then there is another pattern with the same reads. The
goal of Section 5.2 is to bound the probability of the occurrence of some exceptional
patterns that contain the blocking configurations but remain identifiable due to
symmetry. Then in Section 5.3 we bound the probability of the existence of a
blocking configuration from below, and finally in Section 5.4 we combine these
results to prove Theorem 1.2.
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5.1. Combinatorial results for non-identifiability. We begin to make these
ideas precise with the following definitions.
Definition 5.1. Let G be a group and let C,K ⊂ G. For any h ∈ CK, we define
the center set around h to be
Ch = C ∩ hK−1.
In other words, Ch is the set of centers c ∈ C such that h ∈ cK.
Definition 5.2. Let G be a group and let C,K ⊂ G. For any h ∈ CK, we define
the shell around h to be
Sh = (ChK) \ {h}.
Additionally, we let S¯h = ChK.
Notice that for arbitrary g, h ∈ CK, the shells Sg and Sh are not necessarily
translates of one another, since the center set C can be different “near” g than it
is “near” h. Nonetheless, for any h ∈ CK, we have that Ch ⊂ hK−1, and hence
Sh ⊂ hK−1K. We refer to hK−1K as the maximal shell around h. Since the
shells around two elements need not be translates, it will be useful to have a formal
definition for the “type” of shell around an element.
Definition 5.3. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, and let a ∈ CK. The shell type
at a is defined to be a−1Ca.
Note that two elements a and b have the same shell type, i.e., b−1Cb = a
−1Ca,
if and only if Cb = ba
−1Ca. Given some set A ⊂ CK, we define IA to be the set
of shell types that occur for some a ∈ A, and for any α ∈ IA, we let Aα denote
the set of a ∈ A with shell type α. Then |IA| is the number of different shell
types represented in the set A. We will consistently use lowercase Greek letters to
represent elements of IA in order to avoid confusion with elements of G.
The following elementary lemma is used to show that if a read shape hK contains
g, then hK is entirely contained in the maximal shell around g.
Lemma 5.4. Let G be a group, let g, h ∈ G, and let A ⊂ G. If g ∈ hA, then
hA ⊂ gA−1A.
Proof. Suppose g ∈ hA, so ∃a1 ∈ A such that g = ha1, and h = ga−11 . If we now
consider some c ∈ hA (possibly g), then ∃a2 ∈ A such that c = ha2 = ga−11 a2,
which yields that c ∈ gA−1A, and hence hA ⊂ gA−1A. 
The blocking configurations that we use to guarantee non-identifiability are sim-
ply repeated shells. We begin our analysis of repeated shells by making some useful
definitions.
Definition 5.5. Let G be a group and let C,K ⊂ G. Define the set LC,K to be
the set of locations where we consider patterns to have repeated shells, i.e.,
LC,K =
{{a, b} ⊂ CK : Cb = ba−1Ca, Ca ∩ Cb = ∅}.
Then, for any a, b ∈ LC,K , we define the (a, b)-Repeated Shell set,
RSC,K(a, b) =
{
x ∈ AG : x(Sa) = σba
−1
(x)(Sa) and x(a) 6= x(b)
}
.
Lastly, we define the Repeated Shell set,
RSC,K =
⋃
{a,b}∈LC,K
RSC,K(a, b).
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Note thatRSC,K is indeed measurable. We viewRSC,K as the event that a random
configuration has a repeated shell.
Next, we define a collection of involutions on AG that swap the labels of two
locations. We briefly discuss their utility following the definition.
Definition 5.6. Let G be a group and let C,K ⊂ G. Given two elements a 6= b ∈ G,
we define the function ϕa,b : AG → AG by the rule
ϕa,b(x)(g) =


x(b), g = a
x(a), g = b
x(g), otherwise.
In other words, ϕa,b(x) is the same as x, except that the labels at a and b are
swapped.
The idea here is that if a pattern x contains repeated shells at a and b, then
ϕa,b(x) will have the same multi-set of reads as x does, which we state in the
following lemma. It would be convenient for our arguments if having a repeated shell
guaranteed non-identifiability. However, there may be some patterns with repeated
shells that are still identifiable, and we account for such exceptional patterns in the
next section.
Lemma 5.7. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, let {a, b} ∈ LC,K , and let x ∈
RSC,K(a, b). Then ϕa,b(x) 6= x and RC,K
(
x(CK)
)
= RC,K
(
ϕa,b(x)(CK)
)
.
Proof. Let x′ = ϕa,b(x), w = x(CK), and w
′ = x′(CK). First, clearly w 6= w′,
because x ∈ RSC,K(a, b), which implies that w(a) 6= w(b), and thus w′(a) = w(b) 6=
w(a). To show that RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′), let us first find some permutation φ of
C such that ∀c ∈ C,
σc(w)(K) = σφ(c)(w′)(K).
Note that Ca ∩ Cb = ∅, since {a, b} ∈ LC,K . Now let φ : C → C be defined by the
rule
φ(c) =


ba−1c, c ∈ Ca
ab−1c, c ∈ Cb
c, otherwise.
To check that φ is well-defined, we note that if c ∈ Ca, then since {a, b} ∈ LC,K ,
we must have
ba−1c ∈ ba−1Ca = Cb,
and similarly for c ∈ Cb.
Additionally, we can clearly see that φ is an involution because any c ∈ Ca maps
to an element in Cb, and vice versa, and the maps between them are inverses of
each other. Our goal now is to show that ∀c ∈ C,
σc(w)(K) = σφ(c)(w′)(K).
First, for any c1 ∈ C \ (Ca ∪ Cb) we have that φ(c1) = c1. Then for any k ∈ K,
we have
σc1(w)(k) = w(c1k) = w
′(c1k) = σ
c1(w′)(k) = σφ(c1)(w′)(k),
because c1k 6= a, b. Therefore we have that σc1(w)(K) = σφ(c1)(w′)(K).
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Next, we consider any c2 ∈ Ca, which means φ(c2) = ba−1c2. We remark the
following argument is identical for any c3 ∈ Cb, replacing a with b. The goal
is similar as before, however we must now take into account if c2k = a. Let us
consider this case first, so let k ∈ K such that c2k = a (as we know a ∈ c2K), and
then we have
σc2(w)(k) = w(c2k) = w(a)
= w′(b) = w′(ba−1a) = w′(ba−1c2k)
= σba
−1c2(w′)(k) = σφ(c2)(w′)(k).
Next, we consider any other k ∈ K such that c2k 6= a (and also c2k 6= b). We now
want to ensure that φ(c2)k = ba
−1c2k 6= a, b.
First, assume that ba−1c2k = b. This implies that c2k = a which has already
been established to be false, so ba−1c2k 6= b. Now, assume that ba−1c2k = a. We
also have that φ(c2)k ∈ CbK, which means a ∈ CbK. Let c′ ∈ Cb and k′ ∈ K such
that a = c′k′, which implies that c′ = a(k′)−1. Therefore, c′ ∈ Ca, however this is
a contradiction, because Ca ∩ Cb = ∅, so ba−1c2k 6= a.
Clearly c2k ∈ CaK \ {a} = Sa, and since x ∈ RSC,K(a, b), we must have
w(c2k) = w(ba
−1c2k). Then, for any g 6= a, b ∈ CK we have that w(g) = w′(g), so
σc2(w)(k) = w(c2k) = w(ba
−1c2k)
= w′(ba−1c2k)
= σba
−1c2(w′)(k) = σφ(c2)(w′)(k).
Combining the two previous displays, we have ∀c2 ∈ Ca that σc2(w)(K) = σφ(c2)(w′)(K).
Following the same argument for c3 ∈ Cb, replacing a with b, yields σc3(w)(K) =
σφ(c3)(w′)(K).
As we have considered all elements in C, we therefore have ∀c ∈ C, σc(w)(K) =
σφ(c)(w′)(K) for the permutation φ. Then, by Lemma 2.4, we conclude that
RC,K(w) = RC,K(w′). 
5.2. Exceptional patterns. As we mention above, it is not necessarily true that
any x ∈ RSC,K(a, b) is non-identifiable; indeed, it may happen that ϕa,b(x)(CK) ∈
C(x(CK)). In order to account for such patterns, we estimate the probability of
selecting a pattern with a repeated shell that is still identifiable. To do so, we first
require a few group theoretic definitions and lemmas.
Definition 5.8. Let G be a group, and let A ⊂ G. The stabilizer of A, denoted
by GA, is defined as
GA = {g ∈ G : gA = A}.
We remark that this is precisely the usual definition of the stabilizer if we consider
the action of G on the power set P(G). It is an elementary exercise to show that
GA is a subgroup of G. Since G may be infinite, we cannot immediately guarantee
that GA is a finite subgroup. However, the following lemma yields that GA must
be finite whenever A is finite.
Lemma 5.9. Let G be a group and let A ⊂ G be finite. Then |GA| ≤ |A|, and in
particular, every element of GA has finite order.
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Proof. Fix some element a ∈ A. Then clearly |GA| = |GAa|. Since gA = A for all
g ∈ GA, we observe that ga ∈ A for all g ∈ GA, and therefore GAa ⊂ A. Hence
|GA| = |GAa| ≤ |A|. Furthermore, since GA is a subgroup of G, every element in
GA must have finite order. 
For a set F ⊂ G, define the event E(F ) as the set of all patterns such that every
element of F has the same label. The measure of this event is given precisely by
equation (3.3). Next, we consider sufficient criteria for a pattern to be contained
within two such events.
Lemma 5.10. Let G be a group, C,K ⊂ G, a, b ∈ CK, and let x ∈ AG such
that x(a) 6= x(b). Further suppose that there is some g ∈ GC such that x(CK) =
σg
(
ϕa,b(x)
)
(CK). Then ∃m ∈(0, ord(g)) such that b = gma and x ∈ E(P1)∩E(P2),
where
P1 = {a, ga, · · · , gm−1a}, and P2 = {b, gb, · · · , gord(g)−m−1b}.
Proof. Let x′ = ϕa,b(x). By Lemma 5.9, g has finite order. We note that
(5.1) x(h) = σg(x′)(h) = x′(gh), ∀h ∈ CK.
Additionally, since x(a) 6= x(b), we see that x 6= x′, and therefore g 6= e. Also, since
x(a) 6= x(b), we note that a 6= b.
Now, for any 0 < n < ord(g), we have that gn 6= e, and then gna 6= a. By
definition of x′, if gna 6= b, then we have
(5.2) x′(gna) = x(gna).
Also, since a ∈ CK, there exists some c ∈ C and k ∈ K such that a = ck. Since
g ∈ GC , we have that gnc ∈ C, and hence gna = gnck ∈ CK. Then by (5.1), we
have
(5.3) x(gna) = σg(x′)(gna) = x′(gn+1a).
Suppose for contradiction that ∀n ∈ (0, ord(g)), b 6= gna, and consider any such
n. By the inductive application of (5.2) and (5.3), we obtain
x(a) = x′(ga) = x(ga) = x′(g2a) = · · · = x(gord(g)−1a) = x′(gord(g)a) = x′(a).
However, this equality contradicts our assumption that x(a) 6= x(b), because x′(a) =
x(b) by definition. Therefore ∃m ∈ (0, ord(g)) such that b = gma.
The inductive application of (5.2) and (5.3) starting from x(a) now gives
x(a) = x′(ga) = x(ga) = · · · = x(gm−1a) = x′(gma) = x′(b) = x(a).
This implies x ∈ E(P1). Starting with x(b) and inductively applying (5.2) and
(5.3), we have
x(b) = x′(gb) = · · · = x(gord(g)−m−1b) = x′(gord(g)−mb) = x′(a) = x(b),
which implies x ∈ E(P2). Therefore, x ∈ E(P1) ∩ E(P2). 
Next we give a bound on the probability of RSC,K ∩ IC,K , the event that a
pattern has a repeated shell and yet is still identifiable.
Lemma 5.11. Let G be a group, let C,K ⊂ G, let A be a finite alphabet, let p be
a probability vector on A, and let µp be the product measure pG on AG. Then
µp
(RSC,K ∩ IC,K) ≤ |CK|3π2(p) |CK|2 −1.
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Proof. First, for a, b ∈ CK and g ∈ GC , define the set
TC,K(a, b, g) =
{
x ∈ AG : x(a) 6= x(b), x(CK) = σg(ϕa,b(x))(CK)},
and then define the set
TC,K =
⋃
a,b∈CK
⋃
g∈GC
TC,K(a, b, g).
Consider some x ∈ RSC,K∩IC,K . Then there exists {a, b} ∈ LC,K such that x ∈
RSC,K(a, b), and in particular x(a) 6= x(b). Then by Lemma 5.7, x′ = ϕa,b(x) 6= x
andRC,K
(
x(CK)
)
= RC,K
(
x′(CK)
)
. Since we also have that x ∈ IC,K , it must be
the case that x′(CK) ∈ C(x(CK)), and therefore ∃g ∈ GC such that σg(x′)(CK) =
x(CK). Hence x ∈ TC,K(a, b, g). Since x ∈ RSC,K ∩ IC,K was arbitrary, we see
that
RSC,K ∩ IC,K ⊂ TC,K ,
and therefore µp
(RSC,K ∩ IC,K) ≤ µp(TC,K) by monotonicity.
We now focus on finding a bound for µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)). For any a, b ∈ CK and
g ∈ GC , suppose x ∈ TC,K(a, b, g), and let x′ = ϕa,b(x). By definition, x satisfies
the hypotheses of Lemma 5.10, and therefore (by the lemma) there is some integer
m ∈ (0, ord(g)) such that b = gma and x ∈ E(P1) ∩E(P2), with
P1 = {a, ga, · · · , gm−1a}, P2 = {b, gb, · · · , gord(g)−m−1b}.
Note that P1 ∪ P2 = 〈g〉a, and this union contains both a and b. Since the only
difference between x and x′ is the labels at a and b, we have that x′
(
CK \{a, b}) =
x
(
CK \ {a, b}), and in particular x′(CK \ 〈g〉a) = x(CK \ 〈g〉a). Since we also
have that x(CK) = σg(x′)(CK) and translation by g preserves the set CK \ 〈g〉a,
it must be the case that
x
(
CK \ 〈g〉a) = σg(x′)(CK \ 〈g〉a) = σg(x)(CK \ 〈g〉a).
This equality establishes that x is in the repeat set R((CK \ 〈g〉a); g) (defined in
Section 3). Thus, we have shown that
(5.4) TC,K(a, b, g) ⊂ E(P1) ∩ E(P2) ∩R
(
(CK \ 〈g〉a); g).
Since P1, P2, and CK \〈g〉a are all pairwise disjoint, we have that E(P1), E(P2),
and R(CK \ 〈g〉a; g) are mutually independent, and then by (5.4) and (3.2),
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)) ≤ µp(E(P1) ∩ E(P2) ∩R(CK \ 〈g〉a; g))
= µp
(
E(P1)
)
µp
(
E(P2)
)
µp
(R(CK \ 〈g〉a; g)).
Furthermore, by (3.3) and Theorem 3.1, we have that
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)) ≤ π|P1|(p)π|P2|(p)π2(p) 12 |CK\〈g〉a|
= πm(p)πord(g)−m(p)π2(p)
1
2 (|CK|−ord(g)).
Next we distinguish several cases in terms of m and ord(g). If ord(g) = 2, then
it must be the case that m = 1, since 0 < m < 2 and m ∈ N, and in this case,
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)) ≤ π1(p)π2−1(p)π2(p) |CK|2 − 22
= π2(p)
|CK|
2 −1,
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since π1(p) = 1. Next, in the case that either m = 1 or ord(g)−m = 1, the other
quantity is clearly ord(g)− 1 with ord(g) ≥ 3. Applying Lemma 2.7, we get
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)) ≤ π1(p)πord(g)−1(p)π2(p) |CK|2 − ord(g)2
≤ π2(p)
ord(g)
2 −
1
2 π2(p)
|CK|
2 −
ord(g)
2
≤ π2(p)
|CK|
2 −1.
Lastly, in the case that both m ≥ 2 and ord(g) −m ≥ 2, we also have by Lemma
2.7 that
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)) ≤ πm(p)πord(g)−m(p)π2(p) |CK|2 − ord(g)2
≤ π2(p)m2 π2(p)
ord(g)−m
2 π2(p)
|CK|
2 −
ord(g)
2
≤ π2(p)
|CK|
2 −1.
In all cases, we see that for any a, b ∈ CK and g ∈ GC ,
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g)) ≤ π2(p) |CK|2 −1.
Finally, by applying the union bound, the previous display, and the fact that
|GC | ≤ |C| ≤ |CK| (by Lemma 5.9), we have
µp(TC,K) ≤
∑
a,b∈CK
∑
g∈GC
µp
(TC,K(a, b, g))
≤
∑
a,b∈CK
∑
g∈GC
π2(p)
|CK|
2 −1
= |CK|2|GC |π2(p)
|CK|
2 −1
≤ |CK|3π2(p)
|CK|
2 −1.
As we have already shown that µp(RSC,K ∩ IC,K) ≤ µp(TC,K), we have estab-
lished the desired result. 
5.3. Estimating the probability of non-identifiability. We now turn towards
bounding the probability of RSC,K from below. At its core, our argument involves
an application of the second moment method to collections of disjoint shells. Using
this argument, we show that the probability of having a repeated shell is large,
which then implies that the probability of non-identifiability is large. We begin
with a definition.
Definition 5.12. Let G be a group, and let C,K ⊂ G. Then a set D ⊂ CK
satisfies the Disjoint Shell Condition (DSC) if for any a 6= b ∈ D, S¯a ∩ S¯b = ∅.
Note that if D satisfies the DSC, then for any distinct a, b ∈ D with the same
shell type, we have {a, b} ∈ LC,K . Recall that for an arbitrary set A ⊂ CK, the
set IA is the set of shell types of elements of A, and for α ∈ IA, the set is the set of
all elements of A with shell type α.
Lemma 5.13. Let G be a group, and let C,K ⊂ G. Suppose there is a nonempty
set D ⊂ CK satisfying the DSC such that ∀α ∈ ID, |Dα| ≥ 2. Then
µp(RSC,K) ≥ 1− 4
√
|ID|(1− π2(p))−1
|D|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
[ √
|ID|
|D|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
+ 2
]
.
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Proof. To begin, ∀α ∈ ID, we let Sα = a−1Sa for any a ∈ Dα. Note that Sα
is the same regardless of the choice of a, because for any a, b ∈ Dα, we have
a−1Ca = b
−1Cb.
Now, for any α ∈ ID and distinct a, b ∈ Dα, we define the indicator random
variable 1a,b = 1b,a for an arbitrary pattern x ∈ AG by the rule
1a,b(x) =
{
1, x ∈ R(Sa; ba−1) ∩
(AG \ E({a, b}))
0, otherwise,
where E({a, b}) denotes the event that an arbitrary pattern has the same label at
a and b. Note that by definition, 1a,b(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ RSC,K(a, b).
For any α ∈ ID, we define the set D∗α to be the collection of two-element subsets
of Dα, and we note that |D∗α| =
(
|Dα|
2
)
. We then define the random variable X by
X =
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
1a,b.
Clearly, if X(x) ≥ 1 for some x ∈ AG, then we have some {a, b} ∈ LC,K and
x ∈ RSC,K(a, b), which means that x ∈ RSC,K . Therefore (X ≥ 1) ⊂ RSC,K , and
we can bound the probability of RSC,K by monotonicity, i.e.,
µp(RSC,K) ≥ µp(X ≥ 1) = 1− µp(X < 1).
Since X is an integer valued random variable, the event that X < 1 is the same as
the event that X ≤ 0. We then have by Chebyshev’s Inequality that
µp(RSC,K) ≥ 1− µp(X ≤ 0)
= 1− µp
(
E[X ]−X ≥ E[X ])
= 1− µp
(
E[X ]−X ≥ E[X ]√
Var(X)
√
Var(X)
)
≥ 1− Var(X)
E[X ]2
.
(5.5)
We now focus on finding an expression for Var(X) and E[X ]. First, we have that
E[X ] =
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
E[1a,b]
=
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
µp
(
R(Sa; ba−1) ∩
(AG \ E({a, b}))).
Note that Sa ∪ ba−1Sa = Sa ∪ Sb. Since we know that S¯a ∩ S¯b = ∅ (because
D satisfies the DSC), this union must be disjoint. Additionally, we know that
{a, b} and Sa ∪ Sb are disjoint, so by (3.2), we see that R(Sa; ba−1) and E({a, b})
are independent, and hence R(Sa; ba−1) and AG \ E({a, b}) (the complement of
E({a, b})) are independent as well. Using this fact in the previous display, we
obtain
E[X ] =
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
µp
(R(Sa; ba−1))µp(AG \ E({a, b}))
=
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
µp
(R(Sa; ba−1)) (1− µp(E({a, b}))) .
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Since Sa and ba
−1 = Sb are disjoint, Theorem 3.2 gives that µp
(R(Sa; ba−1)) =
π2(p)
|Sa| = π2(p)
|Sα|. Additionally, (3.3) gives that µp
(
E({a, b})) = π2(p). Substi-
tuting these expressions into the previous display yields
E[X ] =
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
π2(p)
|Sα|(1− π2(p))
= (1− π2(p))
∑
α∈ID
(|Dα|
2
)
π2(p)
|Sα|.
Since |Dα| ≥ 2, we also have that |Dα| − 1 ≥ |Dα|2 , which gives the inequality(
|Dα|
2
)
= |Dα|(|Dα|−1)2 ≥ |Dα|
2
4 . Applying this inequality to the previous display
gives
(5.6) E[X ] ≥ 1− π2(p)
4
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2π2(p)|Sα|.
Now we consider Var(X), which can be written in terms of covariances,
Var(X) =
∑
α,β∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
∑
{c,d}∈D∗
β
Cov(1a,b,1c,d).
If we consider two distinct shell types α, β ∈ ID and pairs {a, b} ∈ α and {c, d} in β,
then clearly {c, d} ∩ {a, b} = ∅, because c and d are in a different equivalence class
from a and b. Additionally, since D satisfies the DSC, the shells around a, b, c, and
d are all pairwise disjoint, which means 1a,b and 1c,d are independent. As a result,
Cov(1a,b,1c,d) = 0. Dropping these terms in our expression for Var(X) yields
Var(X) =
∑
α∈I
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
∑
{c,d}∈D∗α
Cov(1a,b,1c,d).
The remaining terms in this sum can be split into three cases.
The first is when {c, d} = {a, b}. In this case,
Cov(1a,b,1a,b) = E[1a,b]− E[1a,b]2 ≤ E[1a,b] = π2(p)|Sα|(1− π2(p)).
Note that this case clearly only occurs once in the innermost sum. Next, we have
the case that |{a, b} ∪ {c, d}| = 3, meaning one of c or d is exactly a or b. Without
loss of generality, suppose that c = b. To account for this, we estimate the number
of such pairs of two-element subsets of Dα by 2(|Dα| − 2) ≤ 2|Dα|, because for c,
we choose one of a or b (so we have 2 choices), and for d we choose some other
element in Dα, of which there are |Dα| − 2. In this case, we have that
Cov(1a,b,1b,d) = E[1a,b1b,d]− E[1a,b]E[1b,d] ≤ E[1a,b1b,d].
Since 1a,b and 1b,d are indicator variables, the expectation of their product is just
the probability of the intersection of the events on which they are both 1, and so
E[1a,b1b,d] ≤ µp
(
R(Sa; ba−1) ∩
(AG \ E({a, b})) ∩R(Sb; db−1)).
We remark that we have left the event AG \ E({b, d}) out of this intersection,
which gives rise to the inequality. Noting that the event R(Sa; ba−1) ∩R(Sb; db−1)
denotes the event that Sa, Sb, and Sd all have the same labels, with ba
−1 mapping
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Sa to Sb and da
−1 mapping Sa to Sd, we can equivalently represent this event as
R(Sa; ba−1, da−1). Substituting, we get
E[1a,b1b,d] ≤ µp
(
R(Sa; ba−1, da−1) ∩
(AG \ E({a, b}))).
Since we have that Sa ∪ Sb ∪ Sd is disjoint from {a, b}, we have by (3.2) that
R(Sa; ba−1, da−1) and E({a, b}) are independent, which means R(Sa; ba−1, da−1)
and AG\E({a, b}) are also independent. By Theorem 3.2, µp
(R(Sa; ba−1, da−1)) =
π3(p)
|Sa| = π3(p)
|Sα|, and we know µp
(
E({a, b})) = π2(p), which yields
E[1a,b1b,d] ≤ µp
(R(Sa; ba−1, da−1))(1− µp(E({a, b})))
= π3(p)
|Sα|(1− π2(p)).
Thus, by applying Lemma 2.7, we obtain that
Cov(1a,b,1b,d) ≤ π3(p)|Sα|(1− π2(p)) ≤ π2(p) 32 |Sα|(1 − π2(p)).
The third and final case concerns the pairs of disjoint two element subsets of Dα. In
this case, each of the four shells are disjoint, and thus 1a,b and 1c,d are independent
and all of these terms are zero.
By applying our estimates in all three cases, we obtain that
Var(X) ≤
∑
α∈ID
∑
{a,b}∈D∗α
π2(p)
|Sα|(1− π2(p))
[
1 + 2|Dα|π2(p) 12 |Sα|
]
= (1− π2(p))
∑
α∈ID
(|Dα|
2
)
π2(p)
|Sα|
[
1 + 2|Dα|π2(p) 12 |Sα|
]
≤ (1− π2(p))
4
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2π2(p)|Sα|
[
1 + 2|Dα|π2(p) 12 |Sα|
]
.
(5.7)
By combining (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7), we get
µp(RSC,K) ≥ 1− 4
(1− π2(p))
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2π2(p)|Sα|
[
1 + 2|Dα|π2(p) 12 |Sα|
]
[∑
β∈ID
|Dβ |2π2(p)|Sβ |
]2 .
Let us now simplify the expression on the right-hand side. To compress the notation,
let
Pα = |Dα|π2(p)
|Sα|
2 .
Then we see that
µp(RSC,K) ≥ 1− 4
(1− π2(p))
∑
α∈ID
P 2α[∑
β∈ID
P 2β
]2 − 8(1− π2(p))
∑
α∈ID
P 3α[∑
β∈ID
P 2β
]2
(i)
≥ 1− 4(1− π2(p))
−1∑
α∈ID
P 2α
− 8
(1 − π2(p))
[∑
α∈ID
P 2α
] 3
2[∑
β∈ID
P 2β
]2
= 1− 4(1− π2(p))
−1∑
α∈ID
P 2α
− 8(1− π2(p))
−1[∑
α∈ID
P 2α
] 1
2
.
(5.8)
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Inequality (i) is possible as a result of the monotonicity of the ℓp norms: if we
consider the vector P = (Pα)α∈ID , then
∑
α∈ID
P 3α = (‖P‖3)3 ≤ (‖P‖2)3 =
(∑
α∈ID
P 2α
) 3
2
.
We now focus on bounding from below the sum that appears in this expression.
Given any a ∈ CK, we have that S¯a ⊂ aK−1K, so ∀α ∈ ID, |Sα| ≤ |K−1K|. Thus∑
α∈ID
P 2α =
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2π2(p)|Sα|
≥
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2π2(p)|K
−1K|
= π2(p)
|K−1K|
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2
(ii)
≥ π2(p)|K
−1K| 1
|ID|
[∑
α∈ID
|Dα|
]2
(iii)
= π2(p)
|K−1K| |D|2
|ID| .
(5.9)
Equality (iii) is due to the fact that
∑
α∈ID
|Dα| = |D|. Inequality (ii) follows from
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:(∑
α∈ID
1 · |Dα|
)2
≤
∑
α∈ID
12
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2 = |ID|
∑
α∈ID
|Dα|2
Finally, applying the estimate (5.9) in (5.8) and then simplifying gives
µp(RSC,K) ≥ 1− 4|ID|(1− π2(p))
−1
|D|2π2(p)|K−1K|
− 8
√
|ID|(1− π2(p)−1)
|D|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
= 1− 4
√
|ID|(1− π2(p))−1
|D|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
[ √
|ID|
|D|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
+ 2
]
,
which concludes the proof. 
5.4. Proof of Theorem 1.2. With this probability bound on RSC,K , we can now
prove Theorem 1.2. We note that the theorem does not require defining a sequence
of sets satisfying the DSC (Definition 5.12), as that could be cumbersome for an
arbitrary choice of G, C, and K. It turns out, however, that we can construct a
sufficiently large set satisfying the DSC out of a set of elements with potentially
intersecting shells using the set Bn. Recall the statement of the theorem.
Theorem 1.2. Let A, p, {Gn}, {Cn}, {Kn}, and {µnp} be as in Section 1 such
that limn |CnKn| =∞ (G1). Suppose there exists a sequence {Bn} such that Bn ⊂
CnKn,
(N1) limn
ln |IBn |
ln |CnKn|
= 0, and
(N2) limn
ln |Bn|
ln |CnKn|
= 1.
Further, suppose
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(N3) ∃ǫ > 0 s.t. ∀n≫ 0 |K−1n Kn| ≤ (1 − ǫ) 2H2(p) ln |CnKn|.
Then non-identifiability holds a.a.s.
Proof. First, we take n large enough that |CnKn| ≥ 2. We begin by inductively
constructing a sequence of sets {Dn} that each satisfies the DCS with respect to
Gn, Cn, and Kn. For the first element d1 in our set Dn, take some arbitrary
element of Bn ⊂ CnKn. For the next element in Dn, we cannot choose some other
arbitrary element from Bn, because it might be the case that its shell intersects
with the shell around d1 (soDn would not satisfy the DSC). By Lemma 4.4 however,
we know that for any c ∈ CnKn, we have d1K−1n Kn ∩ cK−1n Kn 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ c ∈
d1K
−1
n Kn(K
−1
n Kn)
−1 = d1(K
−1
n Kn)
2. As a result, if we choose some element in
Bn \ d1(K−1n Kn)2, we are guaranteed that its shell is disjoint from d1. As long as
we continue to remove the at most |(K−1n Kn)2| elements in Bn which may have a
shell intersecting with the latest element added to Dn, the sets we construct will
always satisfy the DSC. Since we can repeat this process at least⌈ |Bn|
|(K−1n Kn)2|
⌉
times, we can always construct Dn satisfying the DSC and such that
(5.10) |Dn| ≥ |Bn||(K−1n Kn)2|
≥ |Bn||K−1n Kn|2
.
Now let
H = (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
,
and note that |K−1n Kn| ≤ H ln(|CnKn|) for all large n by (N3). Then by applying
this estimate in (5.10), we see that
(5.11) |Dn| ≥ |Bn|
H2 ln(|CnKn|)2 .
Choose any δ > 0 such that δ < min(1, ǫ). By (N2), we have
lim
n→∞
ln(|Bn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = 1,
and therefore, for all large enough n, we have |Bn| ≥ |CnKn|1−δ/2.
Combining this estimate with (5.11), we have
|Dn| ≥ |CnKn|
1−δ/2
H2 ln(|CnKn|)2 .
Furthermore, by (N1), we have
lim
n→∞
ln(|IBn |)
ln(|CnKn|) = 0,
and therefore for all large enough n, we get |IBn | ≤ |CnKn|δ/2.
Since Dn ⊂ Bn, it must be the case that
(5.12) |IDn | ≤ |IBn | ≤ |CnKn|δ/2.
Now consider the set U ⊂ Dn consisting of elements a ∈ Dn that are the unique
representatives of their respective shell types within Dn, i.e., for all b ∈ Dn, if
b 6= a, then the shell type of a is distinct from the shell type of b. Note that there
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is an injection from U into IDn , given by mapping a ∈ U to its shell type. Thus,
|U | ≤ |IDn |, and then by (5.12), |U | ≤ |CnKn|δ/2.
By replacing Dn with the set Dn \ U if necessary, we can guarantee that there
are at least 2 elements with any shell type represented in Dn. To summarize, for all
large enough n, we have a set Dn satisfying the DSC, having at least two elements
of any shell type represented in Dn, and satisfying
|Dn| ≥ |CnKn|
1−δ/2
H2 ln(|CnKn|)2 − |CnKn|
δ/2
= |CnKn|δ/2
[ |CnKn|1−δ
H2 ln(|CnKn|)2 − 1
]
= |CnKn|δ/2 |CnKn|
1−δ −H2 ln(|CnKn|)2
H2 ln(|CnKn|)2 .
(5.13)
We also want Dn to be nonempty, and the bound above may be negative. However,
for large enough n, this bound is positive (in fact it tends to infinity).
We have thus verified all of the hypotheses of Lemma 5.13 for all large enough
n. Then by an application of this lemma, for all large enough n we have
(5.14) µnp (RSCn,Kn) ≥ 1−
4
√
|IDn |(1 − π2(p))−1
|Dn|π2(p) 12 |K−1n Kn|
[ √
|IDn |
|Dn|π2(p) 12 |K−1n Kn|
+ 2
]
.
Focusing for the moment on
√
|IDn |
|Dn|
, we note that
√
|IDn | ≤ |IDn | ≤ |CnKn|δ/2 by
(5.12), and then by (5.13) we get√
|IDn |
|Dn| ≤
H2 ln(|CnKn|)2
|CnKn|1−δ −H2 ln(|CnKn|)2 .
Fixing any α > 1 and taking n sufficiently large, the denominator in the above
display is at least |CnKn|1−δ/α, and therefore√
|IDn |
|Dn| ≤
αH2 ln(|CnKn|)2
|CnKn|1−δ =
αH2 ln(|CnKn|)2|CnKn|δ
|CnKn| .
Combining this estimate with (5.14) (and omitting the dependence on n for the
moment to aid readability), we find
(5.15) µp(RSC,K) ≥
1− 4αH
2 ln(|CK|)2|CK|δ(1− π2(p))−1
|CK|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
[
αH2 ln(|CK|)2|CK|δ
|CK|π2(p) 12 |K−1K|
+ 2
]
.
Furthermore, by (N3), we see that
|CK|π2(p) 12 |K
−1K| ≥ |CK|π2(p)
1
2 (1−ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(|CK|)
= eln(|CK|)e−(1−ǫ) ln(|CK|) = |CK|ǫ.
Combining the two previous displays gives
µp(RSC,K) ≥ 1− 4αH
2 ln(|CK|)2(1− π2(p))−1
|CK|ǫ−δ
[
αH2 ln(|CK|)2
|CK|ǫ−δ + 2
]
.
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By applying this estimate for all large enough n and using that δ < ǫ and µnp (RSCn,Kn) ≤
1, we may let n tend to infinity and conclude that
lim
n→∞
µnp (RSCn,Kn) = 1.
Then by Lemma 5.11, we have
lim
n→∞
µnp (RSCn,Kn ∩ ICn,Kn) ≤ limn→∞ |CnKn|
3π2(p)
|CnKn|
2 −1
= lim
n→∞
exp
(
3 ln(|CnKn|)−
( |CnKn|
2
− 1
)
H2(p)
)
= exp
(
H2(p)
)
lim
n→∞
exp
(
3 ln(|CnKn|)− H2(p)
2
|CnKn|
)
= 0.
To conclude the argument, note that
0 ≤ µnp (ICn,Kn) = 1− µnp (AG \ ICn,Kn)
≤ 1− µnp (RSCn,Kn \ ICn,Kn)
= 1− µnp (RSCn,Kn) + µnp (RSCn,Kn ∩ ICn,Kn).
Then by the previous three displays, we see that
0 ≤ lim
n→∞
µnp (ICn,Kn)
≤ 1− lim
n→∞
µnp (RSCn,Kn) + limn→∞µ
n
p (RSCn,Kn ∩ ICn,Kn)
= 1− 1 + 0 = 0,
which establishes that non-identifiability holds a.a.s. 
6. Examples
In this section we apply Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 to some families of examples and
relate our results to the relevant previous work.
6.1. Hypercubes in Zd with sparse center sets. Our first example is the main
one analyzed in previous works: the d-dimensional integer lattice with both the
center set and the read shape being hypercubes. In the 1-dimensional case, patterns
are just strings of characters, which is precisely how DNA sequences are modeled.
The shotgun reconstruction problem on DNA sequences was analyzed in [13], with
the identification problem on DNA sequences being studied in [2]. In all other
dimensions, this problem was analyzed by Mossel and Ross [11].
We consider A, p, d, {rn}, {mn}, {ℓn}, {Rn}, {Gn}, {Cn}, and {Kn} as in
Section 1.2.1. Recall Corollary 1.3.
Corollary 1.3. If there exists some ǫ > 0 such that for large enough n,
rdn ≥ (1 + ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(Rn),
then identifiability occurs a.a.s. On the other hand, if there exists some ǫ > 0 such
that for large enough n,
rdn ≤ (1− ǫ)
d
2d−1H2(p)
ln(Rn),
then non-identifiability occurs a.a.s.
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Proof of Corollary 1.3, Identifiability. Assume the first display of the corollary. Con-
sider two elements c1, c2 ∈ Cn such that c1 = c2(ℓn · ei) or c1 = c2(ℓn · e−1i ) for
some unit vector ei ∈ Gn. The reads at these locations will overlap in the form
of a d-dimensional rectangular prism, where each side has length rn except in the
dimension i, where the length will be rn− ℓn (which is positive for large enough n).
Define the sequence {Fn} by letting Fn be the collection of all d such rd−1n (rn− ℓn)
prisms (one for the choice of the shorter side being along each of the d dimensions)
for all large enough n. Let us now verify the hypotheses of Theorem 1.1.
First, |Fn| = d for large enough n, and therefore
lim
n→∞
ln(|Fn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = 0.
This verifies (I2). Next, our choice ofFn makes the overlap graphO(Gn, Cn,Kn,Fn)
connected, since it contains a square lattice as a subgraph, which is trivially con-
nected. Thus (I1) is satisfied. Finally, by assumption, we have that rn tends to
infinity because Rn does, and
rd−1n (rn − ℓn) =
rn − ℓn
rn
rdn ≥
rn − ℓn
rn
(1 + ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(Rn).
We then have that rn−ℓnrn tends to 1 from below, since ℓn/rn → 0 by assumption.
As a result, for large enough n, we have
rn − ℓn
rn
≥ 1− ǫ
ǫ+ 2
> 0,
and therefore
rd−1n (rn − ℓn) ≥
(
1− ǫ
ǫ+ 2
)
(1 + ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(Rn)
=
(
1 +
ǫ
ǫ+ 2
)
2
H2(p)
ln(Rdn).
Since |CnKn| = Rdn and ∀F ∈ Fn, |F | = rd−1n (rn − ℓn), this inequality guarantees
that (I3) holds. Then by Theorem 1.1, identifiability occurs a.a.s. 
Proof of Corollary 1.3, Non-Identifiability. Assume the second display of the corol-
lary. First, note that |K−1n Kn| = (2rn − 1)d ≤ (2rn)d. Let us construct a sequence
Bn ⊂ CnKn and verify the hypotheses of Theorem 1.2. The restriction on rdn im-
posed by the assumed inequality gives that rn ≤ L0 d
√
ln(Rn) for some constant L0,
and therefore rn/Rn → 0. As a result, we must have that Rn ≥ 2rn − 1 for all
large enough n, so let Bn = [rn − 1, Rn − rn]d (which is non-empty). This makes
it so that bK−1n Kn ⊂ CnKn for any b ∈ Bn, so none of the shells around any of
the elements in Bn “hang off the side”, which could make the shell around such an
element abnormal in comparison (especially since Cn is a regular lattice).
Due to the regular nature of Cn, it is possible to place a hypercube with side
length ℓn at each of the elements of Cn, and it will ultimately tile nearly all of
CnKn without overlap. Bn is entirely contained within this tiling however. As a
result, it is possible to uniquely represent each element b ∈ Bn by some c ∈ Cn and
a ∈ [0, ℓn − 1]d ⊂ Gn where b = ca. We remark that we are using multiplicative
notation here for consistency with the rest of the paper, although for this particular
group, additive notation is more standard (e.g., b = c + a). Additionally, if some
other b′ ∈ Bn is represented as b′ = c′a for some c′ ∈ Cn and the same a ∈ [0, ℓn−1]d,
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then b and b′ have the same shell type, because they are both positioned identically
relative to the underlying grid in Cn. As a result, there are at most ℓ
d
n different
possible shell types in Bn, making |IBn | = ℓdn.
Since ℓn grows more slowly than rn, for large enough n, we have ℓn < rn. Ad-
ditionally, we note that the assumed inequality gives that rn ≤ L0 ln(Rn) for a
constant L0 and all large enough n. By applying these inequalities, we get
ln(ℓdn) ≤ ln(rdn) ≤ d ln(L0 ln(Rn)) = d ln(L0) + d ln(ln(Rn)),
and as a result, for all large enough n, we have
0 ≤ ln(|IBn |)
ln(|CnKn|) =
ln(ℓdn)
ln(Rdn)
≤ ln(L0) + ln(ln(Rn))
ln(Rn)
.
Taking the limit as n tends to infinity, we obtain that
lim
n→∞
ln(|IBn |)
ln(|CnKn|) = 0,
which verifies (N1).
Now recall that |Bn| = (Rn − 2rn + 2)d and |CnKn| = Rdn. Then with the fact
that rn ≥ 1, we have
lim
n→∞
ln(|Bn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = limn→∞
d ln(Rn − 2rn + 2)
d ln(Rn)
= lim
n→∞
ln(Rn)
ln(Rn)
+
ln
(
1− 2 rnRn + 2Rn
)
ln(Rn)
= 1 + lim
n→∞
ln
(
1− 2 rnRn + 2Rn
)
ln(Rn)
= 1,
where we have used the hypothesis that rn ≤ L0 ln(Rn) in the last equality. This
verifies (N2).
Additionally, by hypothesis, we have that
rdn ≤ (1− ǫ)
d
2d−1H2(p)
ln(Rn),
and thus
(2rn − 1)d ≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(Rdn).
Since |K−1n Kn| = (2rn − 1)d and |CnKn| = Rdn, we have verified condition (N3).
Then an application of Theorem 1.2 gives that non-identifiability occurs a.a.s. 
Previous papers have analyzed the specific case when ℓn = 1: when d = 1, it was
treated in [2, 13], and when d ≥ 2 it was addressed in [11]. Looking specifically at
the case when ℓn = 1 and d = 1, Corollary 1.3 gives identifiability a.a.s. when
rn ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(Rn),
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and it gives non-identifiability a.a.s. when
rn ≤ (1 − ǫ) 1
H2(p)
ln(Rn).
We note that this identifiability result coincides precisely with the identifiability
threshold established in previous work [2, 13] when d = 1 and ℓ = 1. On the other
hand, our non-identifiability bound is smaller than the existing results for d = 1
and ℓ = 1 by a factor of 2 [13]. The main reason for this discrepancy is that the
previous result involves a detailed analysis of DNA sequences, in which case one can
exploit the specific structure of Z to consider more general blocking configurations
and obtain the better bound.
In the case where d is arbitrary and ℓn = 1, Mossel and Ross [11] have previous
results similar to ours. In the case that the probability distribution p is uniform,
we exactly recover the results of [11, Theorem 1.1]. This can be seen by assuming
|A| = q, which gives H2(p) = ln(q) for uniform p. Additionally, when p is not
uniform, we recover precisely the same identifiability results. We note that our
non-identifiability result is more general, in the sense that it covers the case of
non-uniform p while the previous work does not.
6.2. General read shapes in Zd. Let A, p, d, {Gn}, {Cn}, and {Kn} be as
defined in Section 1.2.2. Recall the following corollary.
Corollary 1.4. If
lim
n→∞
| int1Kn|
|Kn| = 1,
and for large enough n,
|Kn| ≥ 4d
H2(p)
ln(n),
then identifiability occurs a.a.s. On the other hand, if
lim
n→∞
diam(Kn)
n
= 0,
and for some ǫ > 0 and large enough n,
|K−1n Kn| ≤ (1− ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(n),
then non-identifiability occurs a.a.s.
Proof of Corollary 1.4, Identifiability. To establish the identifiability statement, we
assume that the first two displays of the corollary hold. We will verify the conditions
of Theorem 1.1. First, by definition of Cn, we have that (G1) holds.
Next, define the sequence {Fn} as Fn = int1Kn, and define the sequence {Fn}
as Fn = {Fn} (the set containing Fn). Clearly, |Fn| = 1, and thus (I2) holds.
Now consider the sequence {On} of overlap graphs On = O(Gn, Cn,Kn,Fn).
Consider any two elements c1, c2 ∈ Cn that differ by a unit vector in Zd. We assume
that c2 = c1ei for the standard basis vector ei (such that ‖ei‖2 = 1) without loss
of generality (as the argument is symmetric for any other unit vector). We remark
that while we are using multiplicative notation for the group, this actually means
c2 = c1 + ei in the standard additive notation. We then note that
c1Kn ∩ c2Kn = c1Kn ∩ c1eiKn = c1
(
Kn ∩ eiKn
)
.
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Since ei is a standard basis vector, we have that int1Kn ⊂ Kn∩eiKn, and therefore
c1Fn = c1
(
int1Kn
) ⊂ c1(Kn ∩ eiKn) = c1Kn ∩ c2Kn.
Hence (c1, c2) ∈ E(On). Since this is true for any two centers that differ by a unit
vector, a regular lattice appears as a subgraph of On, and thus On is connected,
which verifies (I1).
Lastly, let us show that for some ǫ > 0 and large enough n,
|Fn| ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|).
To accomplish this, let ǫ ∈ (0, 1/3), and define the constant H = 2(1 + ǫ)/H2(p).
First, we have that |CnKn| ≤ |Cn||Kn|, which means
H ln(|CnKn|) ≤ H ln(|Cn||Kn|)
= H ln(|Cn|) +H ln(|Kn|)
= Hd ln(n) +H ln(|Kn|),
(6.1)
where we have used that |Cn| = nd. Then by assumption, for all large enough n,
| int1Kn| ≥ (1− ǫ)|Kn|.
Also, since ln(|Kn|)/|Kn| → 0, it must be the case that for large enough n,
H ln(|Kn|) ≤ 1− 3ǫ
2
|Kn|.
Applying this bound in (6.1) gives that for all large enough n,
H ln(|CnKn|) ≤ Hd ln(n) +H ln(Kn)
≤ Hd ln(n) + 1− 3ǫ
2
|Kn|.
(6.2)
Next, by assumption, we have for large enough n that
Hd ln(n) ≤ 1 + ǫ
2
|Kn|.
Then by applying this bound in (6.2), we see that for all large enough n,
H ln(|CnKn|) ≤ Hd ln(n) + 1− 3ǫ
2
|Kn|
≤ 1 + ǫ
2
|Kn|+ 1− 3ǫ
2
|Kn|
= (1 − ǫ)|Kn|
≤ int1 |Kn|
= |Fn|,
which verifies (I3). We have shown that the hypotheses of Theorem 1.1 are satisfied.
By applying the theorem, we conclude that identifiability occurs a.a.s. 
Next, we give the proof of the non-identifiability conditions for Corollary 1.4.
For this, we remark that for any finite set F , we have that ∃g ∈ Gn such that
F ⊂ g[0, diam(F )]d, meaning that some axis-aligned hypercube with side length
diam(F ) contains F .
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Proof of Corollary 1.4, Non-Identifiability. Assume the last two displays of the corol-
lary hold. Let us verify the hypotheses of Theorem 1.2. Clearly (G1) holds. Next,
for some g ∈ Gn, we have that Kn ⊂ g[0, diam(Kn)]d, and therefore CnKn ⊂
g[0, n− 1+diam(Kn)]d and |CnKn| ≤ (n+diam(Kn))d. Let k0 ∈ Kn be arbitrary,
and define
Bn = k0[diam(Kn), n− 1− diam(Kn)]d.
Since Gn is Abelian, k0 ∈ Kn and [diam(Kn), n − 1 − diam(Kn)]d ⊂ [0, n− 1]d =
Cn, we see that Bn ⊂ CnKn. By assumption, we have that n grows faster than
diam(Kn), and thus for large enough n, we have n ≥ 2 diam(Kn) + 1. Hence Bn is
non-empty.
Let us now show that the shell around any element of Bn is the maximal shell.
To that end, let b ∈ Bn. By definition of Bn, there exists l ∈ [diam(Kn), n −
1 − diam(Kn)]d such that b = k0l, and by definition of g, there exists h0 ∈
[0, diam(Kn)]
d such that k0 = gh0. Putting these together, we get b = k0l = gh0l.
Now let k−1 ∈ K−1n . Since K−1n ⊂ g−1[− diam(Kn), 0]d, we have k−1 = g−1h−11 for
some h1 ∈ [0, diam(Kn)]d. Then since Gn is Abelian, we have
bk−1 = gh0lg
−1h−11 = h0lh
−1
1 .
Next observe that
[0, diam(Kn)]
d[diam(Kn), n− 1− diam(Kn)]d[− diam(Kn), 0]d = [0, n− 1]d,
and therefore bk−1 = h0h
−1
1 l ∈ [0, n − 1]d = Cn. Since k−1 ∈ K−1n was arbitrary,
we have bK−1n ⊂ Cn, and therefore the shell around b is the maximal shell around
b. Thus there is only one shell type represented in Bn, i.e., |IBn | = 1. Then clearly
(N1) holds.
Next, we have that |Bn| = (n − 2 diam(Kn))d and |CnKn| ≤ (n + diam(Kn))d,
which gives
1 ≥ ln(|Bn|)
ln(|CnKn|) ≥
ln
(
(n− 2 diam(Kn))d
)
ln
(
(n+ diam(Kn))d
)
=
ln(n) + ln
(
1− 2 diam(Kn)n
)
ln(n) + ln
(
1 + diam(Kn)n
) .
By our assumption that diam(Kn)/n → 0, we may take the limit as n tends to
infinity and obtain that (N2) holds.
Finally, by assumption, there exists ǫ > 0 such that for large enough n, we have
|K−1n Kn| ≤ (1− ǫ)
2d
H2(p)
ln(n)
= (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(|Cn|)
≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|).
This verifies (N3). Then by Theorem 1.2, non-identifiability occurs a.a.s. 
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6.3. Finitely generated groups. For our last example, we fix an infinite but
finitely generated group G with finite symmetric generating set T . Let Ti, γ(n), A,
p, {rn}, {Rn}, {Gn}, {Cn}, and {Kn} be defined as in Section 1.2.3. Corollary 1.5
is stated as follows.
Corollary 1.5. If there exists some ǫ > 0 such that for large enough n,
γ(rn − 1) ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rn))
then identifiability occurs a.a.s. If there exists some ǫ > 0 such that for large enough
n,
γ(2rn) ≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rn)),
then non-identifiability occurs a.a.s.
To prove the identifiability statement of the corollary, we require the T -interior
of a set F ⊂ G, denoted by intT F and defined as
intT F =
⋂
t∈T
F ∩ tF.
Additionally, it is straightforward to show that for any n,m ∈ N, we have Tn+m =
TnTm, and therefore γ(n+m) ≤ γ(n)γ(m), which is known as submultiplicativity.
We now prove our identifiability result for this example.
Proof of Corollary 1.5, Identifiability. Assume the first display of the corollary. Let
us verify the hypotheses of Theorem 1.1. To begin, we define the sequence {Fn} as
Fn = {intT Kn}.
Clearly then, for any elements c, ct ∈ Cn for any t ∈ T , the intersection of the
reads will be cKn ∩ ctKn = c(Kn ∩ tKn), which is a translate of Kn ∩ tKn that
contains intT Kn by definition, so c, ct will be connected by an edge in the overlap
graph. This means that the Cayley graph Γ = Γ(G, T ) is a subgraph of the overlap
graph On = O(Gn, Cn,Kn,Fn), and since Γ is connected (because T is a symmetric
generating set), On must be connected as well. Hence (I1) holds. Also, we have
that |Fn| = 1 and thus (I2) clearly holds.
Our goal now is to bound the size of intT Kn = intT Trn , which we will do by
showing Trn−1 ⊂ intT Trn . Let h ∈ Trn−1 and t ∈ T , so we clearly also have
that h ∈ Trn . We also have that t−1h ∈ Trn , because t−1 ∈ T , so t−1h can be
represented with at most rn generators. This gives h = t(t
−1h) ∈ tTrn , which
means h ∈ Trn ∩ tTrn for all t, and h ∈ intT Trn . Therefore, Trn−1 ⊂ intT Trn , and
| intT Kn| ≥ |Trn−1| = γ(rn − 1).
Then by assumption, we have that there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for large enough
n, ∀F ∈ Fn,
|F | = | intT Kn| ≥ γ(rn − 1) ≥ (1 + ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rn)) = (1 + ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|).
This shows that (I3) holds. Then by Theorem 1.1, we conclude that identifiability
occurs a.a.s. 
We now give our prove of the non-identifiability result for this example.
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Proof of Corollary 1.5, Non-Identifiability. Assume the second display of the corol-
lary. Let us verify the hypotheses of Theorem 1.2. First, we will establish that
∀c > 0, for all large enough n, we have Rn > crn. To see why this is the case,
suppose for contradiction that ∃c > 0 such that Rnk ≤ crnk for a subsequence {nk}
tending to infinity. Then since γ is monotonically increasing, we have
γ
(
2
c
Rnk
)
≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rnk)).
If 2c ≥ 1, then by the fact γ is monotonically increasing, we have
γ(Rnk) ≤ γ
(
2
c
Rnk
)
≤ (1 − ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rnk)),
which is clearly not true for large k, since γ grows faster than ln ◦γ. On the other
hand, if 2c < 1, then let xnk =
2
cRnk and m = ⌈c⌉. By the submultiplicativity of γ,
note that we have γ(nx) ≤ γ(x)n for all n, x ∈ N. By the previous display and this
fact, we see that
γ (xnk) ≤ (1− ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rnk))
≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln
(
γ
(
m
2
c
Rnk
))
≤ (1− ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(γ(xnk)
m)
= (1− ǫ) 2m
H2(p)
ln(γ(xnk)).
However, this inequality cannot hold for all large k, since γ grows faster than ln ◦γ.
Thus, we have shown that ∀c > 0, for all large n, we must have Rn > crn, and
hence limn rn/Rn = 0. We can then define the sequence {Bn} as Bn = TRn−2rn ,
which is non-empty for large enough n (as Rn − 2rn must tend to infinity).
We start by counting the number of shell types represented in Bn, denoted |IBn |.
Let b ∈ Bn, and consider bK−1n = bT−1rn . Since Trn is symmetric, we have that
T−1rn = Trn , which means bK
−1
n = bTrn . Let h ∈ bTrn , so for some t ∈ Trn , h = bt.
Since b ∈ TRn−2rn , we must have that h ∈ TRn−2rn+rn = TRn−rn = Cn, so we have
that bK−1n ⊂ Cn. Therefore, the shell around any element in Bn is the maximal
shell around that element, and there is a single shell type represented in Bn. This
clearly yields (N1).
Next, since |Bn| = γ(Rn − 2rn), we have
1 ≥ ln(|Bn|)
ln(|CnKn|) =
ln(γ(Rn − 2rn))
ln(γ(Rn))
=
ln(γ(Rn − 2rn)γ(2rn))− ln(γ(2rn))
ln(γ(Rn))
≥ ln(γ(Rn))− ln(γ(2rn))
ln(γ(Rn))
= 1− ln(γ(2rn))
ln(γ(Rn))
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that γ(n + m) ≤ γ(n)γ(m). By as-
sumption, we have that γ(2rn) = L0 ln(γ(Rn)) for some constant L0, and therefore
SHOTGUN IDENTIFICATION ON GROUPS 43
ln(γ(2rn)) ≤ L1 + ln(ln(γ(Rn))) for some constant L1. Applying this inequality in
the previous display and taking the limit as n tends to infinity gives
lim
n→∞
ln(|Bn|)
ln(|CnKn|) = 1,
and thus (N2) holds.
Lastly, we have that
|K−1n Kn| = |T−1rn Trn | = |TrnTrn | = |T2rn | = γ(2rn),
and then by assumption we conclude that
|K−1n Kn| = γ(2rn) ≤ (1− ǫ)
2
H2(p)
ln(γ(Rn)) = (1 − ǫ) 2
H2(p)
ln(|CnKn|),
which verifies (N3). Then by Theorem 1.2, non-identifiability occurs a.a.s. 
7. Final remarks and future work
In this work we consider shotgun identification problems in the context of discrete
groups. We present both positive and negative results and illustrate these results
with several families of examples. In future work, we think the following general
framework for shotgun identification problems may be interesting to consider.
Problem (Abstract Shotgun Identification). Let S be a finite set, and let A be
a finite alphabet. Here S serves as a base set to be labeled by symbols from A.
We call such assignments patterns, and denote the set of all such patterns by AS .
These patterns can be viewed as functions from S to A. Let Σ ⊂ P(S) be a
collection of locations at which a pattern w ∈ AS will be observed. Let Ω be some
observation space, and for every T ∈ Σ define an observation function αT : AT → Ω.
With MS(X) representing the multi-sets of elements of a set X , the read operator
RΣ : AS →MS(Ω) is defined as
RΣ(w) =
{
αT
(
x|T
)
: T ∈ Σ},
whose elements are called the reads of a pattern w ∈ AS . In other words, the read
operator provides the observations of w at each element T ∈ Σ. Note that the
location of the observation in w may not be known, but certain local information
can remain intact based on the nature of the observation functions. Let P ≤ Sym(S)
be a subgroup of the symmetric group on S. These permutations define a natural
notion of equivalence on AS , namely that two patterns w and x are equivalent if
there is some p ∈ P such that x ◦ p = w. Letting R−1Σ denote the set inverse of RΣ,
a pattern x ∈ AS is said to be identifiable if
R−1Σ
(RΣ(w)) = {x ∈ AS : ∃p ∈ P s.t. x ◦ p = w}.
In other words, a pattern w ∈ AS is identifiable if given S, P , Σ, A, Ω, {αT : T ∈ Σ},
and RΣ(w), it is possible to uniquely identify the original pattern in AS which
produced the multi-set RΣ(w) up to a permutation p ∈ P . The main question
in the shotgun identification problem is then, what makes a pattern identifiable?
Furthermore, if a probability measure is defined on AS , then one may ask, how
likely is it for a random pattern to be identifiable?
44 JACOB RAYMOND, ROBERT BLAND, AND KEVIN MCGOFF
Our work gives insights into these questions in the case of groups, giving sufficient
conditions for identifiability a.a.s. and sufficient conditions for non-identifiability
a.a.s. However, there are many ways that this work can be extended, such as
studying identifiability of structures other than groups or even tackling the shotgun
identification problem at the level of generality stated here. In the same direction,
since the set Σ is arbitrary, the reads need not have the same shape, so it may be
interesting to analyze the case where there are multiple read shapes (K1, K2, etc.).
On the probabilistic side of the problem, it may be interesting to analyze “noisy
reads”, in which the observations may contain some noise. Although the presence
of noisy reads clearly adds some complexity to the problem, we expect that some of
the basic tools of this paper should still be useful. Our probabilistic analysis focuses
on product measures on the group G, under which the symbols are chosen in an
i.i.d. manner. Future work could involve analyzing different probability spaces
on AG, potentially adding dependence between the labels of two elements. While
many of the combinatorial results of this paper would still apply, little to none of
the probabilistic results are likely to be applicable.
The critical phenomenon observed in the analysis DNA sequence reconstruction
by Motahari et al. [13] leads to a natural question: does this critical phenomenon
exist for shotgun identification problems more generally? For shotgun identifica-
tion problems on graphs, there are some results and conjectures in this direction
[11]. The work presented here suggests that such critical phenomena may exist for
shotgun identification problems on groups as well. We believe it would be interest-
ing to analyze the critical phenomenon in greater detail. In particular, is there a
type of phase transition for shotgun identification problems in general, and if so, is
λc =
2
H2(p)
the correct threshold?
Lastly, let us mention that in the shotgun identification problems considered
here, one has knowledge of the center set C at the time of reconstruction. However,
it may be interesting to study different observational paradigms. In particular, it
might be interesting to consider the case in which the center set consists of some
number of locations drawn at random from some sample distribution.
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